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Political and property crises open up vital new questions for property 
theorists, and analyses of state responses to these crises cast new light on how 
property systems, and property law, adapt and evolve to meet complex 
challenges—while remaining institutionally resilient themselves. The novel 
coronavirus pandemic was an extreme, exceptional, unexpected, significant 
‘shock’ event, with financial, economic, social, cultural and political impacts on 
a scale not experienced since at least the 1930s. The threat the pandemic posed 
to human life demanded immediate action in response to an unexpected and 
unpredictable and urgent threat, delivered under intense public scrutiny. The 
challenges were ‘wicked’: governments were compelled to act, in conditions of 
uncertainty and in response to a complex set of high stakes problems, with 
imperfect information about the impacts of policy choices or the likely 
endpoint of the pandemic.1 
 
In acting swiftly to protect their populations, governments adopted radical 
strategies to shore up housing and home, to tackle street homelessness, and to 
protect tenants and mortgagors from the threat of eviction. Perhaps most 
notably, pandemic policies to protect housing intervened with ‘private 
property’ law in ways that were unimaginable before Spring 2020. In this 
article, we examine the range of ways that governments adapted their 
approaches to property, housing and homelessness during the pandemic. We 
analyze the adaptation of property rules in the pandemic using the new 
theoretical and methodological framework of ‘Resilient Property’. We consider 
the implications of the actions to adjust the laws and policies that govern 
property, housing, eviction and homelessness, and reflect on the legacies of 
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I. Property and the Pandemic 
 
As we write, the coronavirus pandemic has infected more than 222 million 
people worldwide, causing more than 4.6 million deaths. New variants of the 
disease have presented ongoing challenges for states and cities, prolonging 
disruption in the face of planned re-openings, and amid urgent concerns about 
the economic impacts of lockdowns and the pursuit of economic recovery 
plans. In March 2020, the United Nations Trade and Development agency 
projected that the economic slowdown due to the pandemic could reach $2 
trillion. By December 2020, OxFam forecast a significantly higher cost, 
projecting closer to $11.7 trillion (including costs of prevention measures, 
research, and government funding initiatives).2 Economic forecasters predicted 
that the pandemic will shrink global GDP by 4.5%.3  
 
The global coronavirus pandemic could be described as a ‘black swan 
event’:4 an extreme, exceptional, unexpected, significant ‘shock’ event. The 
threat the pandemic posed to human life demanded immediate action by 
states. In the early months of the pandemic, states responded to an unexpected 
and unpredictable and urgent threat, under high levels of visibility and intense 
public scrutiny. The challenges they faced were ‘wicked’: governments were 
compelled to act, in conditions of uncertainty and in response to a complex set 
of high stakes problems, with imperfect information about the impacts of 
policy choices or the likely endpoint of the pandemic.5 Indeed, at the time of 
writing, 18 months on from the World Health Organization’s declaration in 
March 2020 that the novel coronavirus was a global pandemic, the endpoint 
and full impact remain unknown.  
 
Early indications that the financial, economic, social, cultural and political 
 
2 Global Cost of Coronoavirus: $11.7 Trillion, BUSINESS TODAY (August 24, 2021), [available at] 
https://www.businesstoday.in/current/world/global-cost-of-coronavirus-this-is-how-much-covid19-
pandemic-has-cost-the-world-economy/story/425100.html 
3 M. Szmigiera, Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on the Global Economy – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA 
(Aug. 3, 2021) [available at] https://www.statista.com/topics/6139/covid-19-impact-on-the-global-
economy/.  
4 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Penguin, 2nd edn, 
2010); see, for example, P Renjen, ‘The heart of resilient leadership: Responding to COVID-19’ (Deloitte 
Insights, 16 March 2020); online at: https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/insights/economy/covid-
19/heart-of-resilient-leadership-responding-to-covid-19.html.  
5 See E. Bartolomé, L. Coromina, & H. Dülmer, Valores bajo presión: estudio preliminar sobre el 
cambio de valores ante la crisis  de la COVID-19 en España, 55 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE CIENCIA 
POLÍTIca 145 (2021) citing Hermann, Charles F. 1972. International Crises: Insights from Behavioral 
Research.  Nueva York: Free Press; Lucini, Barbara. 2014. Disaster Resilience from a Sociological Perspective 
Exploring Three Italian Earthquakes as Models for Disaster Resilience Planning. Cham: Springer. Disponible 
en: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04738-6. 
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impacts will be on a scale not experienced since the 1930s6 distinguish the 
COVID-19 pandemic from other financial and economic crises and 
recessions—including the Great Recession of 2008, the first worldwide 
recession of the global age.7 Analysis published by Deloitte explained that, 
while:  
“[r]ecessions since WWII have usually been caused by either 
economic policy mistakes, oil shocks, or financial bubbles…[t]he rapid 
economic deterioration of economies and stock markets amid the 
COVID-19 threat represents a new category: a global societal 
shock...”8 
The report noted that:  
“[w]hereas the 2008 global financial crisis was stoked by the 
shutoff of the supply of capital, disruptions on both the supply side 
and the demand side are the cause this time around...Meanwhile, the 
mass quarantining of the population cut off consumption, most acutely 
in the travel, hospitality, restaurant and retail sectors.”   
By mid-2020, economists had predicted major economic, financial and 
social crises,9 with immediate and longer term health, economic and social 
impacts, borne disproportionately by lower socio-economic populations and 
by black and minority ethic people.10  
 
States acted rapidly and under pressure, taking decisive action to contain 
the spread of the virus. The actions taken to mitigate risk and reduce the 
spread of contagion departed from established norms in many jurisdictions, 
and imposed costs across a range of scales—for individuals, businesses and 
industry, markets, and communities. Forced lockdowns led to closures of 
courts; businesses embraced telecommuting to enable workers to comply with 
‘work from home’ orders; and reduced consumption acutely affected those 
businesses that depend on foot traffic and in-person services (like restaurants, 
small merchants, and tourism). National governments mobilized significant 
 
6 A report published by the U.S. Congressional Research Service indicated that the negative impact 
on global economic growth in 2020 was beyond anything in nearly a century – since the 1930s 
depression-era: Congressional Research Service, ‘Global Economic Effects of COVID-19’ (CRS Repot, 
R46270 (https://crsreports.congress.gov). 
7 See discussion of the role of economic shifts following World War II in the Post War Concensus, 
the economic shifts out of the Bretton Woods Compact, and the impact on the global financial crisis 
through the housing crisis in 2008, in Chapter 4.  
8 P Renjen, ‘The heart of resilient leadership: Responding to COVID-19’ (Deloitte Insights, 16 
March 2020) [available at] https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/insights/economy/covid-19/heart-of-
resilient-leadership-responding-to-covid-19.html.  
9 M Nicola, Z Alsafib, C Sohrabic, A Kerwand, A Al-Jabird, C Iosifidisc, M Aghae, R Aghaf, The socio-
economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19): A review, 78 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
SURGERY 185 (2020). 
10Adam Goldstein & Diana Enriquez, Covid-19’s Socioeconomic Impact on Low-Income Benefit Recipients: 
Early Evidence from Tracking Surveys, 6 SOCIUS (Nov. 2020), available at 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2378023120970794’ 
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resources to mitigate the impacts for individuals, communities, businesses and 
industries, while local authorities led ‘on-the-ground’ responses. Many states 
invested significant resources in the development of vaccines, on a 
significantly accelerated timeline relative to any previous vaccination 
development program. Regulations that would have delayed the deployment of 
vaccines were flexed to overcome barriers to rapid distribution. As national 
governments saw the devastating human and economic threats that the novel 
coronavirus posed—and the implications of these threats for their own 
authority and legitimacy—states responded. 
 
In acting swiftly to protect their populations, governments adopted radical 
strategies to shore up housing and home, to tackle street homelessness, and to 
protect tenants and mortgagors from the threat of eviction. Perhaps most 
notably, pandemic policies to protect housing intervened with ‘private 
property’ law in ways that were unimaginable before Spring 2020. In this 
article, we examine a range of ways that govenrments adapted their approaches 
to property, housing and homelessness during the pandemic. Our approach to 
analyzing the adaptation of property rules in the pandemic is based on the new 
theoretical and methodological framework of ‘Resilient Property’, which we 
developed in our forthcoming book, Squatting and the State.11 It draws on the 
central insights of Martha Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory, developing and 
applying these insights for property theory and property law.  
 
Our analysis draws examples from five jurisdictions: the U.S., the U.K., 
Ireland, Spain and South Africa.12 Seeking out a middle-ground—between 
abstract meta-theories or politically polarized binaries, and on-the-ground 
doctrinalism—Resilient Property is rooted in contextualized, historicized 
accounts of state action with respect to private property. It focuses on the 
systems that create property outcomes, seeking to build a realistic 
 
11 L. FOX O’MAHONY AND M. L. ROARK, SQUATTING AND THE STATE: RESILIENT PROPRERTY IN AN 
AGE OF CRISES (NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2022).  
12 Our choices of jurisdictions is purposive: four of the five jurisdictions are governed by written 
constitutions, and these constitutions reflect historical waves in property and constitution-making: the 
U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1780; Ireland’s Constitution was adopted in 1937; Spain’s most recent 
constitution dates from 1978; and the South African Constitution was ratified in 1996. In three cases (the 
U.S., Ireland, South Africa), the adoption of a new constitution signaled the re-making of a post-
colonial/post-apartheid state; and the re-defining of property/citizen/state relations under a new 
constitutional dispensation. [Although, as Purdy observes: “Irony and irenism ran together in early 
American attitudes, partly because of ambivalence as to whether Americans were colonizers or a 
colonized people.”; J. PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL 
IMAGINATION 70 (New Haven: Yale University Press 2010)]. Each of the five jurisdictions has been 
influenced by the global transition from liberalism to neoliberalism and affected by the aftershocks of the 
2007 global financial crisis, austerity, and the affordable housing crisis. See D. King & S. Wood, The 
Political Economy of Neoliberalism: Britain and the United States in the 1980s [in] H. KITSCHELT & OTHERS (EDS), 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1999); Coulter & Nagle (2015);  C. BAN, NEOLIBERALISM IN TRANSLATION: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND 
REFORMS IN SPAIN AND ROMANIA (College Park: University of Maryland 2011); Bond (2014). 
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understanding of how these are adjusted: through tactics, strategies, advocacy, 
but also through events and externalities. Our approach aims to develop new 
insights to how property works, as well as what works, when states respond to 
property problems.  
 
Eschewing the ab initio philosophical commitments that characterize much 
liberal property theory, it is focused on developing a new mode of thinking 
about property, and the methodological and analytical tools to enable this. To 
this end, our approach echoes neo-pragmatism, in seeking first to understand 
state responses to property problems in a complex, multi-scalar governance 
framework. Wood and Smith explained that:  
“…one of the central features of pragmatism is that it is a way of 
thinking that is grounded in anti-foundationalism. Ideas are not 
transcendent, fixed truths, rather they are outcomes of embodied 
experiences and instrumental actions that are dynamic, contingent and 
continually evolving. Decades before the first post-structuralist 
utterances, the early pragmatists were turning away from meta-
narratives, objective truths, and unifying theories, preferring instead to 
develop modes of thinking, which they believed had greater utility for 
helping people to cope with the messiness of everyday life.”13 
Resilient Property offers techniques for engaging with—while not eliding 
or transcending—the ‘messiness’ of property problems, echoing this pragmatic 
concern for dynamic, contingent and continually evolving modes of thought. 
Finally, our analysis of state-level and city-level responses to squatting also 
resonates with the concept of ‘pragmatic localism’—the proposition that ‘high-
scale’ ideology (given effect through national policy) can be mediated to deliver 
‘what works’ to solve policy problems at the local level;14 indeed, “not just 
‘what works, but what works here’.”15  
 
‘Resilient Property’ offers a fresh lens through which to understand the 
nature and effects of state action with respect to private property in periods of 
crisis and pressure. In what has become an ‘age of crises’, the coronavirus 
pandemic exemplifies a compound health/economic/property crisis. Each 
state’s response can be understood relative to other nation states, as well as in 
relation to its own background commitments—the pre-pandemic property 
nomos16 or ‘normative universe’ of legal texts, decisions, norms and narratives 
that frames state responses to property challenges in each jurisdiction. We 
review state responses to eviction, housing and homelessness during the 
 
13 N. Wood & S.J. Smith, Pragmatism and Geography, 39 GEOFORUM 1527 (2008). 
14 J. Coaffee & N. Headlam, Pragmatic Localism Uncovered: The Search for Locally Contingent Solutions to 
National Reform Agendas, 39 GEOFORUM 1585 (2008). 
15 Id. at 1587. 
16 Robert M Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’, 66. 
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pandemic, reflect on the extraordinary steps that states have taken to shore up 
occupation—enabling people to ‘shelter in place’—and evaluate the impact of 
the pandemic through a Resilient Property lens. 
   
II. Resilient Property  
  
A. Resilient Property Theory  
 
As states develop strategies, tools and interpretive norms in response to 
property crises, new legal, political and public discourses of property are 
revealed. In an era of polarized, high-salience political discourse about 
property values, states’ responses to the pandemic provide important signals 
about the states’ stake in ‘private’ property problems. The legitimacy of state 
action with respect to private property rights17 is a prominent theme in 
theoretical debates about the nature of property. Indeed, property is unique 
amongst legal and political institutions for the conflict between competing 
accounts which alternatively define it as a product of the political state or as a 
natural right prior to the state. This conflict is foregrounded in periods of 
heightened inequality, conflict or austerity. Most recently, conflicts over access 
to resources have intersected with an exclusionary turn in the politics of 
belonging.18 ‘Private property’ is imbricated at the heart of these conflicts. On 
the one hand, it is suggested that property law’s raison d’être is to protect the 
status quo of existing property rights. Yet, property law also remains central to the 
pursuit of appropriate and workable solutions to the challenges and conflicts 
inherent to governing property-as-resource.19 
 
Competing visions for the role of property law and property scholarship 
underline the scale of conflict between accounts of private property. These 
conflicts seem particularly irreconcilable; this is heightened by the putative 
‘rivalrousness’ of property claims. In some contexts, new property conflicts 
have prompted creative responses that destabilize conventional frameworks—
 
17 M. R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927). The recent resurgence of interest 
in this theme was captured in a 2017 special issue of THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW, see e.g., L. S. 
Underkuffler, Property, Sovereignty, & the Public Trust, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 329 (2017); L. 
Katz, Property’s Sovereignty, 18 TIL 299 (2017); H. Dagan & A. Dorfman, The Human Right to Private Property, 
18 TIL 391 (2017); T.W. Merrill, Property and Sovereignty, Information, and Audience, 18 TIL 417 (2017); S. 
Dellavalle, The Dialectics of Sovereignty and Property, 18 TIL 269 (2017); E. Benvenisti, Sovereignty and the 
Politics of Property, 18 TIL 447 (2017), amongst others.    
18 See e.g., A. Roy, Paradigms of Propertied Citizenship: Transnational Techniques of Analysis, 38 URBAN 
AFFAIRS REV. 463 (2003) (arguing that definitions of background imperialism in property shapes the 
content of all persons in relationship to property); M. Roark, Under-Propertied Persons, 27 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUBLIC POL’Y 1 (2017) (describing the tropes of resilience created in property owners against others 
through doctrines like nuisance and waste).   
19 J. P. Byrne, The Public Nature of Property Rights and the Property Nature of Public Law [in] R.P. MALLOY 
& M. DIAMOND (EDS), THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (New York: Routledge 2016).  
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from tradeable pollution permits to digital property commons licenses.20 Yet, 
the well-established property conflicts implicated in the law of eviction, 
housing and homelessness appear only to intensify debates about how (and 
whether) states act to balance competing individual (private) and community 
(public) claims. Philosophical theories of property21 are often structured 
around binary frames that reflect underpinning political commitments along a 
left-right, community-liberty, public interest-private rights spectrum. For 
example recent debates in property scholarship have developed frameworks 
based on: property/sovereignty;22 monism/pluralism;23 and 
exclusion24/inclusion25 or sharing.26 Through these frameworks, arguments are 
advanced on behalf of competing interests and claims to property’s rivalrous 
resources.  
 
The structure of private property discourse has important implications for 
property scholarship. On the one hand, the use of binary frames potentially 
reinforces the neoliberal world-view, which—rhetorically at least—relies on 
these binary distinctions to position private power, embodied in “the market,” 
as the source of individual freedom and wealth maximization; while public 
power, as embodied in “the State”, is characterized as “oppressive, inefficient 
and [to] be restrained and limited at all costs.”27 This oppositional structure—
 
20 Byrne (2016) at 12. 
21 This feature extends across the field, from morality or efficiency-based accounts to pluralist or 
‘progressive’ theories: G. S. Alexander, E.M. Peñalver, J.W. Singer & L.S. Underkuffler, A Statement of 
Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 742, 743 (2009) (stating that property implicates pluralistic and 
incommensurable values, including individual, collective, social and environmental interests, amongst 
others); but see E. Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CAL. L. REV. 
107 (2013) (arguing that progressive property’s failure to include distributional injustice in its set of policy 
concerns weakens progressive property’s claim to represent the full set of progressive values), and S. 
Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51 
(2005) (noting the tendency to discuss property problems by excluding the experience of people of color 
and indigenous persons). 
22 Cohen (1927) at 8; see also references from the THEORETICAL ISSUES IN LAW special issue on 
property and sovereignty (2017) at 31.  
23 H. Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409 (2012); G. Alexander, 
Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2011); J. Purdy, Some Pluralism about Pluralism: A 
Comment on Hanoch Dagan’s Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 9 (2013). 
24 T.W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB L. REV. 730 (1998); J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA 
OF PROPERTY IN LAW (New York: Clarendon Press 1997); T. W. Merrill & H. E. Smith, The Morality of 
Property, 48 WM & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007); E. R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 
95 N. C. L. REV. 413 (2017).  
25 D. B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857 (2014) (arguing that property law authorizes 
and enables ‘inclusion’ through a range of informal, contractual and proprietary techniques including 
easements, leases and trusts). 
26 Compare e.g., J. Stern, What is the Right to Exclude and Why Does it Matter? [in] M. H. OTSUKA & J. 
E. PENNER (EDS.), PROPERTY THEORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 38-68 (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press 2018) (questioning whether a property based on sharing truly excludes 
less than traditional exclusionary models of property); with R. Dyal-Chand, Sharing the Cathedral, 46 
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 647, 650 (2013) (describing sharing as the conceptual opposite of exclusion” 
and as a traditional exception to the general rule of exclusion).  
27 P. O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, 74 MLR 532, 535 (2011); see also G.ALBO, S. 
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epitomized in the bifurcation of legal realism into law-and-society on the left 
and law-and-economics on the right—has a tendency to generate politically 
polarized analyses, with all the risks and perils that follow when scholarly 
discourse splits into “a fairly distinct right and left that mostly talk past each 
other…”28 The dominance of politically polarized property theories in 
contemporary property discourse also tends to privilege a unidirectional 
account of the nature and effects of state action or restraint on individuals and 
communities, while obscuring the interactional effects of property problems 
on individuals and institutions—including the state itself.29 Indeed, the scope 
and legitimacy of state action vis-à-vis vested private property rights has 
become a lodestone of modern US property discourse. One implication of the 
political philosophy-bias in contemporary property theory is the tendency to 
privilege normative theories for state action or restraint, over realistic accounts 
of state action.  
 
Resilient Property theory that we develop in this book, reaches beyond 
conventional property theories as ‘theories for state action’—which seek to 
provide normative direction to states regarding the scope of effective and 
legitimate action in the realm of private property—to construct a ‘theory of 
state action’ for property scholarship. Resilient Property theory is anchored in 
the dynamic, responsive role of states as stakeholders in wicked property 
problems. It focuses on state responses to property problems in periods of 
property crisis, and the intersections between state action to allocate resilience 
to individual, aggregated or institutional claims, and the state’s (or the 
government’s) own interest in shoring up its resilience through crises. In doing 
so, Resilient Property departs from the contemporary ideological current in 
property discourse, which focuses on advancing normative agendas for state 
action (typically along progressive-conservative lines). Instead, we seek to 
understand the complexities of state action in response to property problems, 
across a range of jurisdictions, and in the context of the changing pressures on 
the state.30   
 
GINDIN & L. PANITCH, IN AND OUT OF CRISIS: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MELTDOWN AND LEFT 
ALTERNATIVES 28 (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publications 2010); see also D. HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005); R. PLANT, THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2010); A.C. Aman, Jr., Law, Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-
Liberal State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
28 S. L. Winter, The Next Century of Legal Thought? 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 747, 748 (2001). 
29 The state’s role is alternatively defined as a duty to forbear from interference with private 
property rights (R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Oxford: Blackwell 1974)), or a duty to take 
account of the interests of all members of the community (L.S. Underkuffler (2017) (advocating for a 
fiduciary role of the state in balancing interests of property holders and collective interests in takings 
cases)). 
30 To be sure, we are not the first to suggest ways to break a polarizing view of problems to reach 
common solutions. See e.g, D. A. McDonald, Defend, Militate, and Alternate [in] L. PRADELLA & T. MAROIS, 
POLARISING DEVELOPMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO NEOLIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS 125-26 (London: Pluto 
Academic Press 2015) (suggesting approaches that facilitate “context-based evaluations that acknowledge 
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In The Construction of Property, Lehavi argued that property theory does 
not—for definitional purposes—inherently require that we subscribe to core 
content: asserting that while the concept of property has structural and 
institutional traits, it has no “inherent essence.”31 Rather, Lehavi argued, 
property law’s “essence” flows from whatever each society’s institutions 
choose to promote as values and goals. The structural traits of property 
provide the frameworks for translating these ideals from moral and social 
concepts into legal concepts, working through the interactions of legislatures, 
courts, and the professional organizations of civil society (legal and social 
institutions) that create property norms. While Lehavi shifts the focus from 
natural, morality- or rights-based content to the political and social institutions 
that create property norms, the implication remains that the state, and other 
social institutions, choose to promote particular normative agendas based on 
prior normative commitments. Resilient Property recognizes that, in reality, 
these ‘choices’ are contextualized and constrained by a range of factors that are 
both within and beyond the control of the state itself or the social institutions 
it sustains (for example, the market). State responses to property problems are 
dynamically shaped, and sometimes constrained, by a complex array of 
competing, at times overlapping, influences: from multiple or hybrid property 
ideologies, to the implications of property practices ‘on the ground’, in the 
context of national and international events and externalities.  
 
The dominant narratives of contemporary Anglo-American private 
property law tend to ‘look away’ from the state as a primary actor in the 
shaping and re-shaping of property law, or to characterize the state as a neutral 
arbiter of competing claims. Yet, as we have seen time after time, periods of 
crises reveal the enduring, inherent and latent powers of liberal state 
institutions to direct the property system, in ways that have significant 
implications for the resilience of individuals, institutions, and governments 
themselves. Resilient Property analyses recognize how states’ own 
vulnerabilities frames their responses to property problems, as state actors and 
agencies seek to accumulate and preserve their own resilience, at the same time 
as allocating resilience to other stakeholders. This need is foregrounded when 
states act to shore up their authority and legitimacy in the face of conflict or 
crises. Crucially, this insight helps us to recognize that states—particularly in 
periods of property crises—are not neutral arbiters between competing claims. 
It re-positions the (multi-level) state as a central institution for property theory, 
reminding us that when states act on behalf of individuals (e.g., owners, 
squatters, market actors, community members) and institutions (e.g., markets, 
 
local norms but do not fetishise difference.”).   
31 A. LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2013).   
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the institution of private property, society), they do so against the backdrop of 
their own ‘self-regarding’ need for resilience. 
 
Davidson and Dyal-Chand argued that ‘property crises’ open up 
contestable spaces in ongoing debates about the balance between public and 
private sovereignty—which may or may not leave a lasting impact on residual 
property norms after the period of crisis has passed.32 States’ responses to the 
problems of eviction, housing and homelessness during the global financial 
crisis have reflected the changing factual and normative landscapes against 
which property problems are understood. They also, more fundamentally, 
reveal the roles that states play in shoring up the resilience of private property 
rights, owners, markets and others, all the while reflecting back on the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the state itself. As nation states navigate new 
landscapes of statehood and sovereignty, against the backdrops of 
globalization,33 political polarization and partisan antagonism,34 and-most 
recently—the extraordinary pressures resulting from the coronavirus 
pandemic, Resilient Property offers a call to action: for property scholarship to 
recognize and reconsider the role and nature of ‘the state’ and to examine and 
address the implications of state-resilience (or state-fragility) on responses to 
property problems.  
 
B. Resilient Property and Wicked Problems 
 
The coronavirus pandemic, and the economic, property and housing crises 
it has produced, can be characterized as ‘wicked problems’: complex social 
problems that, because they lack a shared interpretation or collective 
understanding are not readily subject to delimitation, attribution of 
responsibility, or the identification of definitive solutions. Rittel and Webber35 
defined wicked problems as ill-structured and contingent: there is no definitive 
statement of “The Problem”, but an evolving set of interlocking issues and 
constraints. The problem cannot be understood without first knowing its 
context and different stakeholders have different views about what the 
 
32 N.M. Davidson & R. Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607 (2010). Drawing 
on Ackerman’s account of transformational constitutional realignments, (B. ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1998); B. ACKERMAN, 
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1998), 
Davidson and Dyal-Chand argued that, while the state has limited resources to influence how property 
law develops outside of crisis moments, property crises create moments of potential to punctuate the 
stable equilibrium of property law’s evolutionary development. 
33 ULRICH BECK, POWER IN THE GLOBAL AGE: A NEW GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 125-165 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press 2005) (describing distinctive strategies employed by states to preserve 
power, including economic strategies, preventative strategies and globalization strategies among others).   
34 Pew Research Center, Political Polarization in the American Public (June 2014). 
35 H. RITTEL & M. WEBBER, DILEMMAS IN A GENERAL THEORY OF PLANNING (Berkeley: University 
of Urban and Regional Development 1973). 
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problem is, and what constitutes an acceptable solution. Solutions are 
proposed and evaluated in a context in which “many parties are equally 
equipped, interested, and/or entitled to judge [them],” but where their 
judgements are likely to vary widely depending on the stakeholder’s 
independent values and goals. Wicked problems engender a high level of 
conflict among stakeholders, with no agreement on the problem or the 
solution: “[n]othing really bonds the problem solving process—it is 
experienced as ambiguous, fluid, complex, political, and frustrating as hell. In 
short, it is wicked.”36  
 
For eample, Bratspies described ‘sustainability’ as: “a particularly wicked 
problem, in part because of the lack of an institutional framework capable of 
developing, implementing, and coordinating the responses necessary to 
address the problem.”37 Similar observations have been made in relation to the 
long-term goal of reforming farming regulation and the U.S. farming and food 
regulation system, which is hampered by the “…diverse social, ethical, 
political, and legal motivations and short-term goals” of stakeholders.”;38 and 
the management of water resources, which is: “characterized by multiple 
conflicting, non-commensurate perspectives.”39 Allen and Gould argued that 
the reason many sustainability problems share the characteristics of wicked 
problems is that: “[e]ach can be considered as simply a symptom of some 
higher order problem…The definition is in the mind of the 
beholder…Furthermore, there is no single correct formulation for a wicked 
problem, only more or less useful ones.”40  
 
The complexities of wicked problems are often elided or avoided through 
the selective use of narrative ‘frames’. These frames: “select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such 
a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”41 
The frame determines how responsibility for causation, intervention, 
resolution, and prevention are attributed to individuals, institutions, and the 
state, and what solutions or goals are intended to result from state action or 
forbearance. The use of frames creates an impression that ‘solutions’ can be 
found through the application of a narrowing, selective lens. Inevitably, the 
 
36 N. Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, 1 INT’L PUB. MGMT. REV. 1 
(2000). 
37 Bratspies (2011) at 292.  
38 L. Fox O’Mahony & N. Cobb (2008); S. J. Morath, The Farm Bill: A Wicked Problem Seeking A 
Systematic Solution, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 389, 402 (2015). 
39 R. M. Bratspies, The Climate for Human Rights, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 308, 317 (2018). 
40 G.M. Allen & E.M. Gould, Complexity, Wickedness, and Public Forests, 84 JOURNAL OF FORESTRY 20, 
22 (1986). 
41 R. M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, 43 JOURNAL OF 
COMMUNICATION 51, 52 (1993).  
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choice of frame (or explanation) determines the nature of the proposed 
resolution.  
 
The choice of research or analytical methodology also performs a ‘framing’ 
function. Research methods set the agenda for research, define the questions 
that are asked by researchers, determine which issues are explored and the 
types of evidence deemed relevant or appropriate to frame, analyze and answer 
questions. When specific methods or approaches dominate within disciplines 
or sub-disciplines (for example, doctrinal approaches to real property law), this 
determines the nature of the knowledge produced by researchers. Sociologist 
John Law described the effects of methodological hegemony, when specific 
approaches or research methods are monopolistic,42 so that: “…methods, their 
rules, and even more methods’ practices, not only describe but also help to 
produce the reality that they understand.”43  
 
Conventional approaches to doctrinal and theoretical property law have 
important framing consequences for property scholarship. Even legal realist 
approaches to property, which seek to recognize and understand property law 
as a dynamic ‘going institution’—in Dagan’s words, ‘a great human 
laboratory’44—often adopt an analytical frame that is bounded by the 
institution of private property law, with litigation and case law at the center. 
This has important consequences for what is seen, or not seen, within this 
frame.45 Narrowing frames elide the complexities of problems, in ways that 
translate and make visible the ‘official’, ‘relevant’ or legible aspects of the 
problem, while concealing (or, in Law’s terms, ‘othering’) aspects of the 
problem that sit outside the official or dominant paradigm. As well as raising 
justice concerns, the effects of framing can practically hinder attempts to solve 
complex or wicked problems.  
 
When conflicting ideas are located within distinct and competing frames, 
there is a risk that problem solving collapses into rhetorical deadlock, with 
 
42 J. LAW, AFTER METHOD: MESS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (London; New York: Routledge 
2004). 
43 Id. at 5. 
44 H. DAGAN (2011) at 54. 
45 Dagan reasoned that ‘because the judicial drama is always situated in a specific human context, 
lawyers have constant and unmediated access to human situations and to actual problems of 
contemporary life. This contextuality of legal judgments ensures lawyers a unique skill in capturing the 
subtleties of various types of cases and in adjusting the legal treatment to the distinct characteristics of 
each category’: Dagan (2011). Indeed, it can hardly be surprising that, relying on litigation as the primary 
(or sole) empirical source, property’s organizing concepts are geared to over-represent the privileged 
property insiders who enjoy particular advantages in access to justice through legal advice and litigation; 
L. Fox O’Mahony, Property Outsiders and The Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism, 67.1 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 
409-445 (2014). See H. GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 
101 (Oxford; Portland: Hart Publishing 1999), for discussion of access, and lack of access, to law and 
justice. 
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analyses and proposals advanced from distinct (and sometimes polarized, 
political) positions which: “…mostly talk past each other…”46 This creates a 
barrier to problem-solving. And when problems seem like “lost causes”, 
collective action is inhibited. This dilemma was articulated by Thomas Ross in 
his essay, ‘The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness’. Ross 
observed that ‘poverty’ is typically characterized, by courts, as an unsolvable 
problem: “one of daunting complexity that is virtually beyond solution.” By 
tacitly accepting that it is a complex and daunting problem—a ‘wicked 
problem’—stakeholders (in Ross’s analysis, judges) abdicate responsibility to 
seek out solutions, deeming themselves helpless to act: 
“We assume that the eradication of poverty, even if possible in 
theory, would require the radical transformation of our society. The 
causes of poverty, we assume, are a product of a complex set of factors 
tied to politics, culture, history, psychology and philosophy. Thus, only 
in a radically different world might poverty cease to exist. And, 
whatever the extent of the powers of the Court, radically remaking the 
world is not one of them.”47  
This rhetoric of helplessness underpins the official narrative that: “[h]ard 
choices, suffering, even ‘Kafka-esque’ results are simply unavoidable.”48  
 
Private property is frequently imbricated in wicked social problems. 
However, the use of theoretical frameworks that apply ab initio political or 
ideological lenses geared to justify, direct or challenge property’s power to 
complex property problems prematurely narrows the analytical frame, in ways 
that are ill-suited to complex problem-solving. Because the art of dealing with 
wicked problems demands that we do not seek, prematurely, to apply a 
normative len in seeking out solutions,49 wicked problem solving methods 
require that we ‘remain in the mess’—keeping options open, and exploring as 
many relationships in the problem topology as possible, before synthesising 
our understanding and starting to formulate solutions. This orientation is also 
a key feature of Fineman’s Vulnerability Theory, which offers insights for 
opening up complex, highly-contested ‘wicked problems’ while adopting a 
perspective of epistemic humility.  
 
C. Vulnerability Theory and Resilience  
 
 
46 S. L. Winter, The Next Century of Legal Thought?, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 747, 748 (2001) (“…the 
related instrumentalism and consequentialism of the realists can be seen (in sometimes extreme form) in 
the political polarization of the academy-where there is a fairly distinct right and left that mostly talk past 
each other.”) 
47 T. Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. LJ 1499, 1501 (1990-
1991).  
48 Id. at 1499. 
49 Ritchey (2013).  
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Resilient Property draws three key insights from Fineman’s ‘vulnerability 
theory’.50 Firstly, we draw on Fineman’s general approach to vulnerability and 
resilience; then on her insights concerning institutional vulnerability, including 
the vulnerability of the state. Finally, we build on Fineman’s framework to 
develop a third insight that provides a central anchor for our analyses of state 
responses to squatting: that a necessary implication of recognizing that the 
state itself is a vulnerable institution is that we recognize the need for states 
(and governments) to act in ways that build their own resilience, to shore up 
their authority and legitimacy in the face of conflict or crises. This third insight 
is central to Resilient Property, and underpins our focus on ‘equilibrium’ in 
section II.C.2. It reminds us that states are not neutral arbiters in relation to 
competing claims to land. It reveals the realities of state action in response to 
squatting: that states are required to negotiate their ‘other-regarding’ 
responsibilities—adjudicating and allocating resilience to individuals and 
institutions—against the backdrop of their own ‘self-regarding’ need for 
resilience. Finally, it enables us to develop a realistic, contextualized, 
conceptualization of state action with regard to complex property problems. 
 
Fineman’s vulnerability theory started by rejecting the idealized, imagined 
“autonomous and independent subject asserted in the liberal tradition”.51 The 
alternative model of legal subjectivity she advanced was anchored in the 
inherent, universal and constant human vulnerability of “real-life subjects”.52 
Fineman argued that this “vulnerable subject”, who is “embodied and 
embedded”,53 is: “[f]ar more representative of actual lived experience and the 
human condition… [and therefore] should be at the center of our political and 
theoretical endeavors.”54 The embodied characteristics of the vulnerable legal 
subject reflect the material realities of ‘bodily vulnerability’—the flesh-and-
blood vulnerability that: “…is apparent at the beginning of life when we were 
totally dependent on others for our survival”;55 and which remains a constant 
component of our human experience. Fineman described our ability to 
mitigate this embodied vulnerability as changing over time and across the life 
course: “embodying different needs and abilities, and often dependent upon 
others at various stages of normal development”.56 While our ability to 
mitigate vulnerabilities may change, our state of constant embodiment means 
that:  
 
50 M. A. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 1, 2 (2008). 
51 Id. at 2. 
52 Id. at 10.  
53 M. A. Fineman, Vulnerability and the Institution of Marriage Paper Symposium: Polygamous Unions- 
Charting the Contours of Marriage Law’s Frontier, 64 EMORY L.J. 2089, 2091 (2015). 
54 Id. 
55 M. A. Fineman, Women, Marriage and Motherhood in the United States: Allocating Responsibility in a 
Changing World, 2011 SINGAPORE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1, 16 (2011). 
56 Fineman (2015) at 2090. 
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“…there is no position of invulnerability at any stage. Rather, 
individuals have different degrees of resilience, which are found in the 
accumulation of resources that mediate, compensate, or alleviate our 
vulnerability to harm and injury as embodied beings.”57  
For Fineman, the concept of ‘resilience’ articulates the means through 
which universal ‘flesh-and-blood’ vulnerability is mitigated and managed: by 
accumulation, access to or acquisition of resources58 to enable us to adapt to, 
ameliorate, compensate for or contain our inherent vulnerability.  
  
A second trope of Fineman’s theory is embeddedness. Each individual’s 
experiences of vulnerability are structured through their social embeddedness in 
the institutional structures and relationships that provide resilience. This concept 
of embeddedness echoes the focus on ‘webby relations and practices’ in actor-
network theory. Fineman draws out the implications of embeddedness for 
resilience: 
“Even before the moment of birth, human beings are embedded in 
webs of economic, cultural, political, and social relationships and 
institutions. We are dependent on those relationships and institutions 
because they support and sustain us. They are the legitimate means 
through which we can gain the assets or resources necessary to 
mediate, negotiate, or cope with our human vulnerability. While there 
is no position of invulnerability, these relationships and institutions 
provide us with resilience. It is our reservoir of resilience that will 
determine whether we can not only persevere but be confident enough 
to take risks or recognize and choose among options and opportunities 
as they arise over the life course.”59 
While vulnerability is characterized as constant and universal, Fineman 
argued that: “…resilience is particular, found in the assets or resources an 
individual accumulates and dispenses over the course of a lifetime and through 
interaction with and access to society’s institutions.”60 Through this move, 
vulnerability theory shifted the implications of legal subjectivity away from the 
individual and onto the institutions that create, enable, provide, and protect 
the “assets” of resilience—the physical and material, social and relational, 
environmental and existential capabilities to weather misfortune and disaster, 
and to avail ourselves of opportunities.  
 
57 Id. 
58 Fineman’s describes sources of resilience as physical resources: e.g., housing, food, money; 
human resources: education, training, knowledge and experience; social resources: relationships, social 
networks, family, community, associations; ecological resources: environments, clean air and water; and 
existential resources: systems of belief or culture that help us to understand our place in the world: see M. 
A. Fineman & R.W. Woodruff, Afterword: Vulnerability and Resilience, 36 RETFÆRD ÅRGANG 84 (2013).  
59 M. A. Fineman & G. Shephard, Homeschooling: Choosing Parental Rights over Children's Interests, 46 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 57, 61 (2016-2017). 
60 Id. at 62. 
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Since vulnerability is understood as an inevitable and constant 
characteristic of the human condition, Fineman’s vulnerability theory demands 
that we resist the habit of defining the “vulnerability” of one claimant (the 
squatter, or the owner, depending on the moral lens applied) in counterpoint 
to the presumed “invulnerability” of the other. Because it resists labelling 
individuals as ‘vulnerable’ or ‘not vulnerable’ it reminds us to avoid conferring 
normatively loaded-up identities onto particular subjects or populations (for 
example, victim/aggressor). Fineman also distinguishes between ‘background 
resilience’—accumulated over time; and the resilience that is allocated to 
mitigate vulnerability in moments of crisis. Her approach re-located the 
underpinning source of difference between people’s abilities to navigate 
opportunities and support, gaps and pitfalls, away from the idea that some 
people are more or less vulnerable than others, to focus on differences in 
people’s opportunities to accumulate and access resilience through their 
interactions with social institutions. Echoing the methodological insights of 
wicked problem theory, vulnerability theory seeks to avoid the trap of 
analytical frames that prematurely narrow and constrain the problem space and 
limit potential solutions. Because she seeks to avoid: “inherently privileg[ing] 
any one outcome of political deliberation”; Fineman described her approach 
as: “invit[ing], if anything, a high degree of epistemic humility”.61  
 
The second insight we take from vulnerability theory concerns the inherent 
vulnerability of social institutions, including ‘the state’. Fineman argued that, 
like people, the societal institutions we create to mitigate our vulnerabilities: 
the market, the family, the welfare system, the institution of private property, 
the state: “…are also vulnerable to things like decay, manipulation, corruption, 
and decline.”62 Fineman emphasized that: “societal institutions themselves are 
not fool proof shelters, even in the short term”.63 Institutions enable us to: 
“mediate, compensate, and lessen our vulnerability” through the accumulation 
of assets of resilience,64 but these institutions are also themselves vulnerable:  
“They may fail in the wake of market fluctuations, changing 
international policies, institutional and political compromises, or 
human prejudices. Even the most established institutions viewed over 
time are potentially unstable and susceptible to challenges from both 
internal and external forces.”65  
The concept of institutional vulnerability is not unfamiliar to liberal 
 
61 A. Grear, Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism, and Co-Symptomatic Injustice: Locating the Vulnerable 
Subject [in] M.A. FINEMAN & A. GREAR, VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL 
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (London; New York: Taylor and Francis 2016).  
62 Fineman & Woodruff (2013) at 88. 
63 Fineman (2008) at 12.  
64 Id. at 22. 
65 Id. at 12.  
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property theorists: indeed, concern for promotion and protection of the 
‘institution of private property’ is a regular theme in liberal property theories. 
The general assumption that property law decision-making must protect and 
uphold the institution of private property implies that, without appropriate 
normative direction, legal and policy decisions risk damaging this foundational 
liberal institution.  
 
For Fineman, the institutions that produce and provide resilience to 
mitigate our vulnerabilities are central because the institutional structures and 
relationships in which vulnerable subjects are embedded determine each 
individual’s particular experience of vulnerability. Vulnerability is mediated 
through the quality and quantity of resources (resilience) that we inherit, 
accumulate or are capable of accessing in any given moment:66 “[w]e are not 
born resilient; it is produced over time and within state-created institutions and 
in social, political, and economic relationships.”67 Fineman also highlighted the 
central role of ‘the state’ in creating and sustaining the economic (e.g., the 
market), social (e.g., the family), legal (e.g., constitutions) and political 
(government) institutions that produce and allocate resilience. These 
institutions of resilience are created, maintained, regulated and backed-up 
through law, which confers legitimacy on their operation and their power over 
individuals.68  
 
Fineman’s aim was to bring the state back into view: looking to the state as 
a source of resilience, and re-imagining individuals’ relationships to the state as 
a resilience-producing institution. Her interest in the state is primarily geared 
around re-conceptualizing its role as ‘active but non-authoritarian’—what she 
terms a ‘responsive state’.69 She describes this as reflecting an underpinning 
reality—that the state is always actively shaping institutions, although: “present 
conceptions of the state underestimate or even ignore the many ways in which 
the state—through law—shapes institutions from their inception to their 
dissolution.”70 A central concern for vulnerability theory is that, by looking 
away from the state—and law—as a site of production for institutional 
resilience, we fail to pay attention to the manner in which this resilience is 
allocated.71 By magnifying the state’s responsibility for the institutions and 
structures it constructs and uses, Fineman advanced her central normative 
claim: “[that] vulnerability analysis demands that the state give equal regard to 
 
66 M. A. Fineman & A. Grear, Introduction, Vulnerability as a Heuristic: An Invitation to Future Exploration 
[in] M. A. FINEMAN & A. GREAR (EDS)( 2013). 
67 Fineman (2015) at 2090. 
68 Fineman (2011) at 16. 
69 Fineman (2008) at 19. 
70 Id. 
71 “Currently, the state minimally supervises these institutions in fulfilling their essential role in 
providing the assets that give us resilience in the face of vulnerability.”; Id. 
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the shared vulnerability of all individuals…”72 The state’s responsibilities thus 
extend both to all individuals, and to: “…how the state has responded to, 
shaped, enabled, or curtailed its institutions.”73 In a further normative move, 
Fineman asks:  
“Has [the state] acted toward those institutions in ways that are 
consistent with its obligation to support the implementation and 
maintenance of a vital and robust equality regime—a regime in which 
individuals have a true opportunity to develop the range of assets they 
need to give them resilience in the face of their vulnerabilities?”74 
Fineman argues that: “[t]he realities of universal and constant vulnerability 
argue for a responsive state that ensures equality of opportunity and 
meaningful, not merely formal access for individuals to society’s institutions.”75 
This approach brings the operation and impact of the state, its institutions and 
structures into focus. Fineman re-positions this ‘responsive state’ as a means 
of achieving: “a more nuanced sense of what constitutes equal opportunity 
than currently theorized—one that is more sensitive to existing inequalities 
and more demanding of the state.”76 
  
While we draw insights from vulnerability theory, Fineman’s ultimate 
exhortation, that we should be ‘more demanding of the state’, highlights a 
point of departure between Fineman’s approach and Resilient Property. 
Vulnerability theory seeks to bring the state under scrutiny as an arbiter, or 
allocator, of the ‘assets of resilience’:77 directing the state towards affirmative 
obligations embedded in state action to allocate resilience between individuals. 
Fineman’s normative agenda is to re-direct the state to: “…operate in ways 
that do not unduly privilege some, while disadvantaging others.”78  
“This focus on the structuring of societal institutions reflects the 
fact that the state has an affirmative obligation not to privilege any 
group of citizens over others and to actively structure conditions for 
equality.”79   
In this sense, vulnerability theory can be understood as a theory for state 
action. At the same time, by recognizing the inevitable vulnerability of social 
institutions, including the state itself, it opens up a useful space from which our 
Resilient Property approach explores the methodological and normative 
implications of the state’s own vulnerability: the state’s own self-interested 
 
72 Fineman (2008) at 20. 
73 Fineman (2008) at 20. 
74 Fineman (2008) at 20. 
75 M. A. Fineman, Equality and Difference: The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV.609, 626 (2015).  
76 Fineman (2008) at 20. 
77 M.A. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L. J. 252, 255 (2010). 
78 Fineman (2008) at 2-3. 
79 Fineman (2008) at 21. 
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need for resilience.80  
 
Applying the terminology used by John Law, the nation-state nomos in 
which state action in relation to property is located is part of the ‘hinterland’ 
that produces specific realities. Law underlined the importance of the 
hinterland in shaping and constraining choices about which realities become 
‘made’ (or ‘unmade’). However, he claimed that: 
“To talk of ‘choices’ about which realities to make is too simple 
and voluntaristic. The hinterland of standardized packages at the very 
least shapes our ‘choices’. We who ‘choose’ embody and carry a bundle 
of hinterlands.”81    
A similar observation can also be made in relation to state action with 
respect to property: that the hinterland (or property nomos) shapes the range of 
responses available to states with respect to property problems. At the same 
time, it is important to be clear that we do not present this as a deterministic 
argument: we are not implying that states have no choices in how they respond 
to property problems. The ‘property nomos’ in each jurisdiction is not 
homogenous, but a complex hybrid of multiple norms and commitments; 
sometimes competing; shifting and evolving over time; and scaled across the 
layers of state action on property. Elements of this normative universe can be 
dialed up and dialed down in particular property moments, or in response to 
property problems as they are manifest across the vertical scale (eg 
national/local). We do not suggest that there are not alternatives to the status 
quo; indeed, moments of crisis demand adaptations to the status quo, if 
equilibrium is to be restored. However, we do recognize the reality that, if 
alternatives to the status quo are to be successfully adopted and sustained, they 
must be built on a legitimate hinterland, located within the window of political 
possibility.82 It is both rare and exceptional for the stresses and strains on the 
property system to trigger a ‘tipping point’ into an altered state—generating a 
new (constitutional, or property system) paradigm to work within (for 
example, the tipping point from apartheid to post-apartheid state).  
 
Resilient Property builds on, but departs from, the insights of vulnerability 
theory by following through the implications of the state’s own institutional 
 
80 While Vulnerability theory has promised to bring the state under scrutiny (see Fineman (2010) at 
255), most of the scrutiny is directed at the state’s failure to allocate resilience to all persons, rather that 
scrutiny about what the state’s own interests may be in allocating the resilience it parcels out.   
81 LAW (2004) at 33.   
82 Known as the ‘Overton window’ after policy analyst Joseph P. Overton, this describes the range 
of legitimate policy options that are acceptable to societies in any given time. While other policy ideas 
exist beyond the Overton window, politicians risk losing popular support if they champion these ideas. 
The Overton window can move, expand or contract, adjusting the range of acceptable policy ideas as 
societal values and norms change. For an application of the concept to global environmental challenges, 
see A. Suzdaleva, Ecological globalistics and the paradigm of world civilization development E3S WEB OF 
CONFERENCES 217, 11993 (2020).   
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vulnerability: focusing both on the state’s role in allocating the resources of 
resilience (its ‘other-regarding’ role) and the state’s own (self-regarding) claim 
to resilience. ‘The state’ and its multi-level institutions (global, regional, 
national and local) flex and adapt over time, in response to changing contexts, 
stresses and pressures. These adaptations affect how actors and agencies 
across the multi-level state mediate conflicting interests. Starting from a 
realistic account of the contemporary state, we recognize that the governance 
of private property, including responses to property problems through law, is a 
complex web of interactions between citizens (individually and collectively) 
and institutions, legal texts and interpretations, regime goals and norms. 
Demands made on the state (for or against state action) must be understood in 
the wider context of the range of pressures and constraints applied to state 
actors and institutions. Property scholarship requires methodologies that take 
account both of the (complex, contested) other-regarding responsibilities of 
the state, on the one hand, and the state’s/government’s own (multi-level) self-
regarding need for resilience on the other.  
 
The dependencies this generates come into sharp relief in moments of 
pressure or crisis for national or local governments. State responses reveal how 
the state’s ‘other-regarding’ responsibilities align with ‘self-regarding’ actions 
that (state actors believe, at least) will shore up the authority and legitimacy of 
state actors and institutions. This focus on state vulnerability (and the 
processes through which states create their own resilience) is timely in the 
current age of crises. The methodology of Resilient Property takes account of 
the multiple and intersecting vulnerabilities and resilience needs at stake when 
homeless people squat on empty land. Our aim is to surface, understand, and 
take seriously the full spectrum of individual, collective, and institutional 
vulnerabilities at stake, including the state’s own stake in property problems. 
By building a more complete picture of the vulnerabilities and resilience 
associated with homeless squatting on empty land, we are seeking to 
understand how the individuals (owner, squatters, neighbors) and institutions 
(markets, communities, housing systems, private property, and the state itself) 
that are implicated in these conflicts marshal the resources of resilience. By 
focusing on the state’s own vulnerability and resilience—alongside its power to 
selectively allocate resilience to others—Resilient Property offers a fresh 
perspective on state responses to property problems—specifically, eviction, 
housing and homelessness—in the pandemic.  
 
D. Sustainability, Equilibrium, and Resilience 
 
The insight that states are simultaneously both ‘self-regarding’–-that is, 
motivated to shore up their authority and legitimacy (the state’s own 
resilience), particularly in periods of crisis—and ‘other-regarding’ in the 
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discharge of governance functions, opens up a new frame for property theory. 
For sure, the ‘other regarding’ role of the state (with respect to property 
interests, the protection of private property, and property allocations) has 
attracted considerable attention in contemporary property theory. In her recent 
work on the ‘fiduciary’ role of the state with respect to private property, 
Underkuffler argued that the relationship between a government and its 
citizens is based not in the social contract but in a ‘fiduciary relationship’ and 
that, as a result, the state acts under a duty to take account of the needs of all 
members of the community.83 Underkuffler’s application of fiduciary theory to 
property offers a fresh perspective through which to give content to the state’s 
responsibilities towards property owners. Because the state’s [other-regarding] 
fiduciary duty applies not only to property owners but to all citizens, the state is 
required ‘to act with due regard for the [beneficiary’s] best interests’. If all 
citizens individually, as well as collectively, are ‘beneficiaries’ of the state’s power, 
the existence of a fiduciary duty demands that: ‘government at the very least 
must engage in serious reckoning with individual citizens’ (as well as collective) 
interests.’84  
 
Underkuffler’s application of fiduciary theory to property theory reaches 
beyond conventional state/owner or owner/non-owner binaries to make the 
case for states to take account of the individual (and collective) interests of 
other (non-owning) members of the community. In deploying the fiduciary 
lens, she simultaneously recognized the government’s obligations towards 
property owners, while also asserting that: 
“Fiduciaries, by reason of the demands of the fiduciary obligation, 
are obligated to all of their beneficiaries equally. There is no basis, in 
fiduciary theory, to rule in—at the outset—the claims of some 
beneficiaries, and to rule out the claims of others. Government as a 
fiduciary must reckon seriously not only with the needs of its 
beneficiaries who own property, but also with the needs of those who 
do not.”85  
The individual interests of property owners ‘must be considered, seriously, 
in sovereign decision-making’;86 and her formulation of the duty-matrix of a 
fiduciary-state promises not to place the claims of non-owners on equal terms 
with private property rights. Underkuffler’s approach foregrounded the 
resilience of the liberal institution of private property;87 but does not consider 
 
83 L. S. Underkuffler, Property, Sovereignty, and the Public Trust, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 
329, 330 (2017).  
84 Id. at 346. 
85 Id. at 348. 
86 Id. at 346. 
87 For example, Underkuffler centres property rights as the ‘guardian’ of other (human) rights: “Of 
all conceivable human interests, none is more fundamental than the ability to appropriate and retain 
property. It is a stark biological fact that of all commonly asserted human rights, property claims are 
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how the state’s own vulnerabilities constrain the discharge of its ‘fiduciary’ 
functions. Where Underkuffler’s fiduciary property theory is a theory for state 
action, Resilient Property develops a realistic account of state action. Fiduciary 
property theory focuses on the state’s duty in mediating the competing claims 
of others; but does not extend to consider the implications and effects of state 
actions (in the exercise of its ‘public fiduciary’ duty) for the state’s own 
resilience: that is, for the perceived effectiveness and legitimacy—the 
resilience—of the state.88  
 
To the extent that fiduciary theory (broadly understood) is premised on a 
concern to mitigate the risk of conflicts of interest between the fiduciary’s own 
interests and the duty owed to beneficiaries (as manifest in the ‘duty-interest 
conflict rule’),89 the relationship between state self-interest and state action is a 
salient consideration. Indeed, the ‘state-as-fiduciary’ model faces some 
complex challenges when applying the duty of loyalty—the essence of the 
fiduciary relationship90—to state-actor fiduciaries. Fiduciaries are required only 
to pursue the interests of beneficiaries when executing their duties: the duty of 
loyalty strictly prohibits conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty, and fiduciary 
law provides powerful remedies to strip fiduciaries of any personal benefit 
 
among the most essential to human life…the ability to live – and to appropriate property to do so – is 
assumed by any other human right of which we can conceive. When it comes to property, the stakes 
could not be higher. In other words, government forbearance towards existing property entitlements is 
rooted in property’s substantive function, and its required guarantees.” Underkuffler (2017) at 347 (emphasis in 
original). This can be contrasted with both Singer and Van der Walt’s de-centring of property rights in the 
wider constitutional or democratic context. Van der Walt argued that property is not: “the saviour, the 
knight on the white steed, the guardian of every other right.” A. J. Van der Walt, The Modest Systemic Status 
of Property Rights, 1 J. L. PROP. & SOC’Y 15 (2014). 
88 OECD, SUPPORTING STATE-BUILDING IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND FRAGILITY: POLICY 
GUIDANCE (Paris: OECD 2011) (laying out how developing and developed countries can better facilitate 
positive state-building processes and strengthen the foundations upon which capable and legitimate 
states are built). 
89 See, e.g., Whichcote v. Lawrence (1798) 3 Ves 740, 750 (30 ER 1248) (when a trustee buys trust 
property for himself he is not acting with ‘that want of interest, that total absence of temptation’; ‘where 
a trustee has a prospect of advantage to himself, it is a great temptation to him to be negligent’; at 752). 
Aberdeen Railway v. Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461, 471 (149 RR 32) (where the risk of personal 
interest leading the fiduciary in a different direction to the interests of beneficiaries was described as ‘the 
very evil against which the rule in question is directed’). U.S. courts adopted the British approach that 
fiduciaries must avoid self-interest conflicts.  See e.g., Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. 503, 555-56 (1846) (“The 
general rule stands upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in relations which 
ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and integrity. It restrains all agents, public and private; 
but the value of the prohibition is most felt, and its application is more frequent, in the private relations 
in which the vendor and purchaser may stand towards each other.”); Farnam v. Brooks, 26 Mass. 212, 
227 (1830) (“And first, the plaintiff would clothe the defendant with the character of a trustee, over 
whose transactions, in relation to the trust fund, courts of equity are particularly watchful, because of the 
temptations trustees are under and the opportunities they have to serve their own interest to the 
prejudice of the cestui que trust.”); Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N.Y. 327, 350 (1860) (“the disability extends to 
all persons who, being employed or concerned in the affairs of another, acquired a knowledge of his 
property.”). 
90 J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 48 (Toronto: Carswell 1981). 
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obtained through their fiduciary position.91 The conflict of interest rule 
prohibits the fiduciary from allowing personal interests to conflict (actually or 
potentially) with the interests of the beneficiary—thus prohibiting disloyal 
conduct grounded in the self-interest of the fiduciary;92 while the conflict of 
duty rule prohibits fiduciaries from acting under conflicting mandates.93   
 
In this section, we reflect on the legitimacy and value of ‘state self-
interest’—that is, decisions made by state actors with the intention of 
producing resilience not only for citizen/beneficiaries and social institutions, 
but for ‘the state’ itself. In making this claim, it is important to distinguish the 
self-interest of ‘the state’ as an enduring political entity from the self-interest of 
the government of the day. While some of us may believe that it would be 
normatively desirable for certain governments to fail, it is reasonable to 
suggest, as a general normative proposition, that it is better if (democratic) 
states do not fail. Of course, it is also highly unusual for states to fail. As Weiss 
reminded us: “…over the long run, most states have (with some notable 
revolutionary exceptions) proved highly adaptive to changing circumstances.”94 
Weiss argued that—notwithstanding the popular trope of ‘state decline’, 
nation-state institutions retain significant capacity and capability to govern; and 
that the strength of these domestic institutions critically determines economic 
success and political stability. In rejecting the narrative of the decline of the 
nation state, Weiss argued that states are highly adaptive, generating resilience in 
response to changing circumstances.   
 
The idea of adaptiveness to changing circumstances is a central component 
of ‘resilience’, as this concept has been developed in the context of 
sustainability theory. ‘Resilience’ is defined as the capacity of a system to 
respond to, and rebound or recover from, shocks (sudden or extreme events) 
and stresses (long-term trends that undermine the system) without changing its 
basic state.95 Resilient systems have the adaptive capacity to remain in a 
functional state;96 to avoid ‘tipping’ into an altered state, by maintaining 
 
91 M. CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 39 (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2010). 
92 K.B. Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decision-Making- Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 
1(1985); J. H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 
929 (2005); M. B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO LJ 67 
(2005). 
93 A. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75 (2004); M. 
Conaglen, Fiduciary Regulation of Conflicts between Duties, 125 LAW Q REV 111(2009); S. L. Schwarcz, 
Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN L. REV. 1867 (2010). 
94 L. WEISS, THE MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE 9 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1998). 
95 B. WALKER & D. SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A 
CHANGING WORLD (Washington: Island Press 2006). 
96 J. Ahern, From Fail-Safe to Safe-to-Fail: Sustainability and Resilience in the New Urban World, 100 
LANDSCAPE AND URBAN PLANNING 341 (2011); L. VALE & T. CAMPANELLA, THE RESILIENT CITY: HOW 
MODERN CITIES RECOVER FROM DISASTER (New York: Oxford University Press 2005). 
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equilibrium in the face of challenges or crises. A related point can be made 
about the resilience of the frames or paradigms that contain and constrain state 
responses to property problems. The ‘hinterland’ or ‘nomos’ of property norms 
shapes state responses to property crises. The property nomos in each of the 
jurisdictions we examined comprised a complex hybrid of norms, providing a 
range of latitude for different types of response to property problems. This 
normative hybridity also supports adaptiveness in moments of crisis; and this 
adaptiveness enables states, governments, and property systems to be resilient: 
to recover, and to avoid tipping into an altered state. Hybridity supports 
flexibility, while the scaling of state responses across the multi-layered 
institutions of the state enables states to meet different resilience needs.  
 
Sustainability theory examines cycles of resilience, continuity and change in 
natural systems. More recently, a significant body of scholarship has drawn on 
its concepts to analyse ‘resilience’ in social systems and institutions—“the 
property of a social system to cope with, survive and recover from complex 
challenges and crises that present stress or pressure that can lead to systemic 
failure.”97 Sisk’s account of ‘democratic resilience’ identified four 
characteristics of resilient social systems: flexibility, recovery, adaptability and 
innovation. He explained:  
“Resilient social systems are flexible (able to absorb stress or 
pressure), can recover from challenge or crises, adaptable (can change 
in response to a stress to the system), and innovative (able to change in 
order to more efficiently or effectively address the challenge or 
crisis).”98 
‘Fragile’ social systems—the opposite of resilient—are susceptible to 
breakage or fracture because they don’t have internal mechanisms to help 
them cope, survive and prosper when confronted with change, challenges or 
crises. As the stability—the resilience—of liberal democratic states comes 
under pressure,99 and post-liberal property systems face into yet another (post-
pandemic) global crisis, the institutional resilience of the state—its capacity to 
cope with changes, challenges and crises without ‘tipping’ into a different state 
(for example, authoritarianism)—raises important and urgent questions for 
property theorists.100  
 
97 T.D. Sisk, Democracy’s Resilience in a Changing World [in] IDEA, THE GLOBAL STATE OF 
DEMOCRACY: EXPLORING DEMOCRACY’S RESILIENCE 37 (Stockholm: International IDEA 2017). 
98 Id. at 38. 
99 The period since 2006 has been characterised as one of crises in democratic regimes; see IDEA 
(2017) noting that the quality of democracy is declining in many countries due to internal and external 
pressures. Diamond framed this as a period of ‘democratic recession’: L. Diamond, Facing up to the 
Democratic Recession, 26 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 141 (2015). 
100 The paradox of Anglo-American liberal property theories is that, although private property is a 
central institution of the liberal state, it is necessarily de-centred or concealed in accounts of state action; 
and the enduring role of the state in supporting and maintaining the system of private property is 
systematically de-centred or concealed in most liberal property scholarship.  
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Van der Walt argued that the dynamic processes of stability and change 
that produce adjustments within hybrid normative orders101—the processes 
through which legislation, judicial interpretation and doctrinal development 
shape and re-shape the content of property law as it tracks political 
movements over time—tend to be crowded out by the dominant political 
mood in any given moment. The systemic importance of normative pluralism 
is not fully reflected in the dominant, or ‘official’, narratives of property law, 
which typically tell simplified stories about property that elevate certainty over 
flexibility, predictability over adaptiveness. These narratives have important 
implications for property theory’s moral reasoning. Most notable, perhaps, as 
we reflect on the importance of adaptiveness, flexibility and innovation to 
maintain equilibrium and enable recovery in times of crises is the narrative that 
locates the essence of property in the ‘property values’ of stability, certainty, 
predictability and the protection of the status quo.102 Van der Walt described the 
dominant normative order—the orthodoxy—as imposing an: 
“…established hierarchy…on law and meaning by the courts and 
the state for the sake of clarity, certainty and 
predictability…established and imposed, as Cover so compellingly 
argued, through violent suppression of alternative views, alternative 
meanings, alternative laws…[that] can only be established by violently 
suppressing some of the energy and diversity that is at work in a legal 
system.”103 
That energy and diversity, plurality and hybridity—distributed across scales 
of governance—enables property systems (and the states that constitute, 
maintain and rely on them) to resist and overcome institutional, structural or 
dogmatic inertia or polarization. It underpins the normative orientation 
towards equilibrium.  
 
101 See A.J. Van der Walt, Resisting Orthodoxy – Again: Thoughts on the Development of Post-Apartheid South 
African Law, 17 South African Public Law 259 (2002); see also A.J. Van der Walt, Dancing with Codes – 
Protecting, Developing and Deconstructing Property Rights in a Constitutional State, 118 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
JOURNAL 258 (2001). 
102 Van der Walt described the role of South African courts, developing the common law following 
the enactment of the 1996 Constitution with its commitment to transformation, as inherently 
conservative: “In the result, the privileging of stability over change, security over novelty, and normality 
over deviation appears as a fact of life, an unbearable force of inertia that resists all but the most urgent 
and unmistakable impulses for change.” Furthermore, he argued, faced with a choice between two or 
more interpretations, the chosen approach was presented as a self-evident, logical necessity: “Courts do 
not only restrict the impact of the Constitution when they are reticent or deliberately obstructive about 
change because they disagree with the politics of transformation—as long as an interpretation is available 
that preserves stability and certainty, courts often simply fail to recognize the availability or the 
interpretive force of an alternative interpretation that threatens those values, even though they might 
acknowledge the need and justification for change in general. The possibility of falling back on well-
known, familiar and comfortable solutions seems to have a destabilizing effect that prevents courts from 
gathering the energy and the inspiration to recognize and support views and approaches that promote 
transformation and reform but threaten security and stability.”; Van der Walt (2001) at 268-9. 
103 Van der Walt (2002) at 271. 
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‘Stability’ (like ‘certainty’) is familiar trope in property law. It is often 
interpreted as the avoidance of change104—a backward-looking commitment to 
the status quo of property rights. The stability norm is thought to “subdue 
uncertainty and flux and to improve stability and security.”105 It is 
characterized as politically neutral, self-evident common sense: property law’s 
‘settled reason’ and the habits of the ‘common law mind’.106 A range of 
standard positions justify this approach, including the need to ensure the 
security of long-term expectations, the reliability of investment strategies, the 
rationality of decision-making about future land use, stable forward planning, 
the need to protect titles taken by purchasers and creditors, and so on. 
Property law’s stability bias is sometimes articulated as an argument for the 
protection of settled expectations on the grounds that to unsettle expectations 
would generate ‘demoralization costs’, by depleting (owners’) confidence in the 
system of property rights107—although this inference has been challenged by 
Davidson, who argued that the property system is better served by prioritizing 
ex post flexibility over ex ante certainty, orienting property rules to support (all) 
parties’ confidence that, over time, they will be treated fairly under a property 
regime that ‘will ensure inclusion’.108 
 
The scale of investment in the infrastructure and resources that support 
dominant paradigms is high, so it is unsurprising that property (law) systems 
are resilient to new paradigm thinking. However, the embeddedness of the 
dominant paradigm at the systems-level should not be confused with the idea 
that specific property rules cannot, or should not, flex to adapt to changing 
circumstances.109 Rather, Resilient Property recognises that it is the very scope 
for adaptation that subsists within each jurisdiction’s (hybridised, multi-scalar) 
property nomos that enables property systems to respond to challenges and 
crises, and so to be resilient. It is this adaptive resilience that enables property 
systems to dissipate the effects of shocks that might otherwise create ‘tipping 
points’ into new paradigms.  
 
 
104 Underkuffler claimed that: “…[p]roperty is, by definition, the protection of the status quo; it 
cannot, of itself, answer the question of when there is a justified change in that status quo.”; Underkuffler 
(2013) at 2016.  
105 Van der Walt (2002) at 270. 
106 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 261-62 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1987). 
107 F. I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). 
108 N. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437 (2011). 
109 Although we also recognise the powerful political influence of vested ‘insider’ property interests 
in fixing specific property rules in place, or evolving rules to better protect property insiders: Lorna Fox 
O’Mahony, ‘Property Outsiders and the Hidden Politics of Doctrinalism’, 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 409 
(2014). 
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Resilient Property offers an alternative conception of ‘stability’, rooted in 
the normative desirability of avoiding tipping points: maintaining legal, 
political, social and economic equilibrium. Property theory and property law 
are embedded in changing national, local and transnational contexts, and 
competing individual and institutional demands for resilience. Maintaining 
equilibrium in a dynamic context, through challenges and crises, requires 
adaptation, flexibility and innovation, and ‘context-appropriate design’—
sensitive to the nuances of the property nomos in each jurisdiction.110 Legal 
resilience has been described as: “…the ability of an Institutional Environment 
to absorb, by legal mechanisms of resistance and recovery, unlawful practices, 
and also to adapt its legal space rules to accommodate and retain, or to 
improve its legal functionality vis-a-vis a new desired practice.”111 The 
resilience of legal systems and property systems depends on being able to 
adapt, to flex and to innovate in the face of unprecedented and unexpected 
challenges and change.112  
 
Resilient Property draws on equilibrium theory to understand how 
resilience is produced, for states and for individuals. Equilibrium theory 
defines ‘resilience’ as the capacity of a system to respond to, rebound, or 
recover from, shocks (sudden or extreme events; tipping points) and stresses 
(long-term trends that undermine the system) without changing its basic state. 
Identifying alignments between the resilience needs of governments, and the 
state’s other-regarding role in allocating resilience, it reveals the complex 
drivers of property outcomes, as these affect individuals and communities, 
social and economic institutions. Finally, in focusing attention on the realities 
of property policy, it identifies realistic spaces for property advocacy.   
 
 
110 Sisk argued that: “Democratic institutions can be designed for resilience, but there are no simple 
solutions and designs must be adapted to local realities. With context-appropriate design, it may be 
possible to craft institutions that are more resilient when they are tested by political, economic or social 
strains and pressures.”; Sisk (2017). 
111 M. A. Heldeweg, Normative Alignment, Institutional Resilience and Shifts in Legal Governance of the Energy 
Transition, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4 (2017). 
112 Arnold and Gunderson argued that, when legal systems favour monocentric and unimodal 
methods and linear processes they are maladaptive and ill-suited to resolving emerging challenges; C. T. 
Arnold & L. Gunderson, Adaptive Law and Resilience, 43 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10426 (2013). 
Their approach—which they term ‘adaptive law’—focuses on how structure emerges out of nested cycles 
of adaptation and change. Echoing the methods of wicked problem theory, they proposed that legal 
frameworks should be developed in ways that mimic the resilience and adaptive capabilities of ecological 
and social systems: (1) adaptive goals that aim for multiple forms of resilience; (2) an adaptive system 
structure that is polycentric, multimodal and multi-scalar; (3) methods of adaptation and context-
regarding flexibility; and (4) iterative processes with feedback loops and accountability mechanisms. This 
also echoes a central premise of Peñalver and Katyal’s Property Outlaws, in which they proposed that the 
behaviours of property rule-breakers provide a necessary impetus to change, that increases the resilience 
of the institution of private property: E. PEÑALVER & S. K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW 
SQUATTERS, PIRATES AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (New Haven: Yale University 
Press 2010). 
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In Part III, we reflect on the property crises we are currently collectively 
facing, across the world: the impact, and aftermath of the global coronavirus 
pandemic. Applying the lens of our Resilient Property theory, we examine the 
emergency measures adopted by several governments as the pandemic 
threatened the health and wellbeing of citizens on a scale that was 
unprecedented for most of our lifetimes. As ‘stay-in-place’ orders, including 
the provision of emergency shelter for unhoused or precariously housed 
people, collided with an upsurge in vacant commercial buildings and stalled 
development projects, the perfect property storm of homelessness, squatting 
and empty buildings/land was brought into fresh relief. Through a Resilient 
Property lens, state responses to property problems in the pandemic reveal the 
resilience needs that states were confronted with during the crisis, and the 
actions they took to maintain and restore equilibrium through the shockwaves 
of the pandemic and its aftermath.   
 
III. Framing the Pandemic: State Responses 
 
Bacchi argued that when we frame policy interventions as straight-
forwardly rational responses to objective social or economic problems, we risk 
over-simplifying the policy-making process. Rather, she argued, we should 
understand the orientation of policy initiatives as a consequence of how those 
problems are framed, understood, and described: of how they are 
“represented.”113 This process of representation has been profoundly affected 
by the imperatives of the coronavirus pandemic as the delivery and 
sustainability of housing became a ‘vector of contestation’.114 Indeed, as Rogers 
and Powers observed, Covid-19 foregrounded: “experiences of home, … in 
home, and capacities to pay for housing and more.”115 Reflecting on the 
dramatic re-framing of homelessness and precarious housing in Australia, 
Parsell et al described these re-framed representations as opening up new 
spaces of political possibility.116 The distinction between pre-pandemic 
representations of homelessness, and the steps that states took to bring 
‘everyone in’, was underpinned by an important narrative shift. Before the 
pandemic, representations of homelessness, and homeless people, in Australia 
and elsewhere were: “[i]nformed by prevailing neoliberal 
rationalities…represented as a problem of defective individuals who require 
 
113 C. BACCHI, POLICY ANALYSIS: WHAT IS THE PROBLEM REPRESENTED TO BE (French Forest: 
Pearson 2009).  
114 D. Rogers & E. Powers, Housing Policy and the Covid-19 Pandemic: The Importance of Housing Research 
During this Health Emergency, 20 INTERNATIONAL J. OF HOUSING POLICY 177, 178 (2020). 
115 Id.  
116 C. Parsell, A Clarke, & E. Kuskoff, Understanding Responses to Homelessness During Covid-19: An 
Examination of Australia, HOUSING STUDIES at 4(2020). They observed that the new political framing of 
homelessness had been: “…shaped by prevailing political rationalities, whose assumptions, categories 
and aetiological logics set the conditions of possibility for exercising political power in particular times 
and places.”. 
30 YOUR TITLE [29-Nov-21 
tailored support to address problematic behaviors and personal pathologies.”117 
However, from early in the pandemic period, representations of homelessness 
as a matter of individual personal responsibility (and failure) were overtaken by 
representations framed by collective public health.  
 
The re-framing of homelessness as a public health emergency focused 
policy attention on urgent state action to bring homeless people in to sheltered 
accommodation. It generated a political imperative for states to act,118 
providing the political cover for measures that, in a pre-pandemic context, 
would have been considered to be outside the window of discourse for 
politically viable policies—the ‘Overton window’.119 Overton argued that 
policy options can be understood along a spectrum—from the unthinkable, 
radical, and acceptable, to those that are considered sensible but not yet 
popular; with those policies that come within the ‘Overton window’ (popular 
ideas, or current policy) defined as the realm of the ‘politically possible’. The 
window is determined by public opinion, and—according to the theory—feeds 
into the political calculus through which politicians decide which policies are 
worth pursuing. In most cases, it is argued, only policy choices that fall within 
the ‘window of the politically possible’ are likely to be successful or garner 
support from the electorate. Political leaders respond to signals that help them 
identify where their Overton windows lie, in the context of the policy 
challenges that governments face.  
 
A majority of states responding to the pandemic deployed ‘innovative 
property policy’ initiatives. These included the provision of (a) fiscal support—
in the form of relief and welfare payments, and initiatives such as furlough to 
keep people in employment; (b) bringing homeless people into shelter; and (c) 
eviction bans to safeguard the precariously housed from landlord or mortgagor 
eviction actions that would have left them without shelter. While the details 
varied, the common footprint of these responses signals to the role of housing 
resilience in shoring up the resilience of each of the five jurisdictions we have 
 
117 Id.   
118 The framing of the problem as an emergency elicited convenient fictions that animated political 
responses. As noted by Jacob Remes and Andy Horowitz, “disasters are interpretive fictions” because 
they are predicated on particularized vulnerabilities and risk experienced in a social setting. Indeed, as 
Remes and Horowitz argue, there is no real “disaster”, but rather events that expose the differing levels 
of resilience that emerge in political, social, and economic contexts. See J. REMES & A. HOROWITZ, 
CRITICAL DISASTER STUDIES (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2021). To this end, they 
argue, disasters are not inevitable but rather are “bound up in human history, shaped by human action 
and inaction.” Id. As we have argued in the context of property and the state, understanding why the 
state deploys resilience for some actors and not for others is essential to assessing how property systems 
operate, how legal scholars interact with those systems, and how outcomes of resilience can be 
fostered—if not through property, in other institutions of the state.   
119 The idea of an ‘Overton window’ (named for policy analyst Joseph Overton) refers to public 
perceptions of policy ideas. Policy ideas that are within the ‘Overton window’ are considered to be within 
the range of acceptable policy ideas: see https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow. 
29-Nov-21] YOUR TITLE 31 
explored in this book.120  
 
A. Fiscal support: emergency relief 
 
Although the U.S. Federal Administration was initially reluctant to provide 
fiscal relief, by mid-May 2020, a shift in the U.S. policy response was beginning 
to emerge. As families who lost jobs and wages struggled to pay for food, pay 
mortgages and rent, or provide for basic needs, and concerns were raised 
about the economic impacts of prolonged lockdowns, the pandemic was 
reframed as both a public health crisis and an economic crisis. On May 23, 
2020, former U.S. President Donald Trump, lamenting the economic impact 
of global shutdowns, famously quipped that: “the cure cannot be worse than 
the disease”. At the same time, the scale of the economic threat led many 
governments (and central banks) to intervene with unprecedented emergency 
measures to help people in financial difficulty. In the U.K., the Conservative 
Government (the Party that implemented ‘austerity’ measures in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis) announced a £330 billion package of emergency loan 
guarantees to help people in financial difficulties,121 and pledged a further £20 
billion of fiscal support for U.K. businesses. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve 
announced a $300 billion lending program to support Main Street businesses, 
and the Trump administration secured a $2 trillion ‘virus-aid package’, the 
CARES Act, to support the economy and shore up financially vulnerable 
households. This package included an initial ban on foreclosures of federally-
backed mortgages and a ban on evictions of tenants in federal housing 
programs for four months; as well as food assistance, healthcare assistance and 
a range of loans, loan guarantee and relief schemes.  
 
Similarly, in May 2020, the South African Government announced a $26 
billion (10% of GDP), three-phase program of financial assistance measures 
including measures to support and rescue businesses (phase 1); social relief and 
economic support (phase 2), including direct support to households and 
individuals for the relief of hunger and social distress and job protection by 
 
120 One vector that demonstrated the common problem amongst states was the role that social 
networks playing in communicating the disease, and communicating information about the disease.  
These social networks spread across state lines, linking countries in both the challenges of addressing the 
pandemic as well as communicating responses to the pandemic.  As one group of researchers studying 
the impact of social networks on the disease concluded “countries had the opportunity of learning from 
others about social arrangements that were more or less effective in containing the disease.” See Fabio 
Milani, Covid-19 Outbreak, Social Response, and Early Economic Effects: A Global VAR Analysis of Cross-Country 
Interdependencies, 34 J. OF POPULATION ECONOMICS 223, 226 (2020).  
121 Measures implemented in the U.K. included a job retention (furlough) scheme; deferring VAT 
and income tax payments; a statutory sick pay relief package for small and medium sized England to 
support enterprises; a 12 month business rates holiday for all retail, hospitality, leisure and nursery 
businesses in England; grant funding for small businesses and retail, hospitality and leisure businesses; a 
business interruption loan scheme, and a lending facility from the Bank of liquidity for larger businesses. 
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supporting workers’ wages; and an economic recovery package (phase 3).122 In 
Ireland, the Government provided a ‘COVID-19 Pandemic Unemployment 
Payment’—a state-funded emergency aid program to provide financial relief 
for employed and self-employed people who were unable to work due to the 
pandemic. An initial commitment to fund this payment for 6 weeks from 
March 2020 was extended until April 2021. In July 2020, the Irish Government 
announced a €7.4 billion stimulus package of measures to boost economic 
recovery. And in June 2020, as national and global economies shrank rapidly 
and many millions lost their jobs, the Spanish Government launched what has 
been described as: “…the world’s biggest economic experiment…”;123 a 
universal basic income program intended to help the poorest households meet 
basic financial needs and avoid becoming trapped in poverty.124 Spain also re-
directed €150 million of EU Cohesion Policy funding to strengthen the health 
care sector as part of a national pandemic response that included a €2.5 billion 
European Regional Development Fund investment to support health services 
and businesses in mitigating the consequences of the pandemic in Spain.125  
 
While governments in each of these countries re-deployed state resources 
to bolster the resilience of the workforce, neither the impact nor the outcome 
was uniform. The U.S. experienced record unemployment claims, triggering 
record unemployment insurance claims by individuals. States with more 
structured social protection regimes pre-pandemic experienced a less drastic 
reduction in employment, and were able to tailor their economic support 
programs towards other forms of resilience. In Spain, the deployment of 
Universal Basic Income (UBI) was both a response to pre-pandemic economic 
conditions and the depletion of state and social resilience in the pandemic 
crisis. UBI seeks to provide citizens with a “social protection floor”, 
guaranteeing to each citizen a basic level of income security.126 Ortiz et al., 
claimed that UBI is designed to allow people “breathing space to engage in 
meaningful, decent work, and care for their families or others in their 
community.”127 UBI is also associated with empowering women who provide 
 
122 J. Devermont & T. Mukulu, South Africa’s Bold Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, CENTER FOR 
STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, [available at] https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-africas-bold-
response-covid-19-pandemicGovern 
123 C. Arnold, Pandemic Speeds Major Test of Universal Basic Income; 583 NATURE 502 (2020). 
124 Germany is trialing a similar scheme, although on a much smaller scale: A. Payne, Germany is set to 
trial a Universal Basic Income Scheme WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM  (August 20, 2020).  
125 Coronavirus response €150 million of Cohesion policy funding reprogrammed to mitigate the social impact of the 
pandemic in Spain, European Commission [available at] 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2020/08/08-11-2020-coronavirus-response-
eur150-million-of-cohesion-policy-funding-reprogrammed-to-mitigate-the-social-impact-of-the-
pandemic-in-spain.    
126 Graham Perkins, Sarah Gilmore, David S.A. Guttormsen, & Stephen Taylor, Analysing the Impacts 
of Universal Basic Income in the Changing World of Work: Challenges to the Psychological Contract and a Future 
Research Agenda, 2021 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT J. 1, 3 (2021).  
127 I. Ortiz, C. Behrendt, A Acuna-Ulate, & N.Q. Ahn, Universal Basic Income Proposals in Light of ILO 
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unpaid labor in the home, and providing financial headroom for women to 
leave abusive relationships.  
 
The novel coronavirus pandemic raised fresh interest in UBI policies, as 
governments around the world implemented radical policies to provide 
economic assistance during the crisis. In Spain, UBI has been a policy 
objective for progressive social movements including PAH (Platforma de 
Afectados por la Hipoteca) (Platform for people affected by Mortgages) and the 
Indignados Movement (associated with Spain’s anti-austerity platforms and 
demonstrations)128 since the 2008 housing crisis. Between 2011 and 2016, four 
UBI pilot programs were launched in Spain.129 In 2016, the most recent pilot 
(‘B-Mincome’) was launched by the City of Barcelona. B-Mincome was a pilot 
program to study the effects of Universal Basic Income on three local 
neighborhoods. The city program provided between €100 and €1676 per 
month per household for 644 randomly selected residents. In 2015, the former 
leader of PAH Ada Colau was elected mayor on a platform of prioritizing 
social change, addressing poverty including housing insecurity, and income 
inequality.130 Indignados member, Carlos Declós, described universal basic 
income as a leading legislative priority for PAH, whose tactics since 2013 have 
included advocacy for housing affordability, as well as political squatting to 
highlight the urgent need for affordable housing.131  
 
The background and success of Barcelona’s B-Income Program, along 
with the heightened insecurity brought on by the pandemic, opened a policy 
window for the much broader adoption of Basic Income nationwide. As the 
lack of economic resilience amongst Spain’s large population of temporary 
workers posed a major threat to the economic and social stability of the 
country, the state deployed Universal Basic Income protections on a national 
scale. The national UBI plan is a means-tested regimen aimed at shoring up 
 
Standards: Key Issues and Global Costing, ESS Working Paper No. 62, at 5, [available at] 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3208737 
128 PHILLIPE DE PAJIS, BASIC INCOME: A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR A FREE SOCIETY AND A SANE 
ECONOMY 192 (2017) (noting that the Radical Left party emerged from the Indignados movement 
associated with M-11 associated with anti-austerity policies, including Universal Basic Income).  
129 Laura Colini, The B-Mincome Project Journal No 1, THE URBAN LAB OF EUROPE (December 2017). 
The four programs are Programa De recualificación professional de las personas que agoten la protección por desempleo 
(2011), Prepara (2011), and Programa Extraordinario de Activación para el empleo PAE (2015).  B-
Mincome was launched by the City of Barcelona in 2016.   
130 Laura Colini, The B-Mincome Project Journal No 1, THE URBAN LAB OF EUROPE 10 (December 
2017).  
131 In March 2019, the Young Foundation published a report titled Getting By in Barcelona: A portrait 
of life before basic income, depicting how income-to-housing gaps prompted by high unemployment and 
evictions since the 2008 housing crisis had led to Spain having the “highest income inequality of any 
country in Europe.”; Amanda Hill Dixon, Hannah Green, Hannah Davis, Victoria Boelman, & Sergio 
Sanchez, Getting By in Barcelona: A Portrait of Life before Basic Income, Report of Young Foundation 8 (March 
2019).  Laura Colini, The B-Mincome Project Journal No 1, THE URBAN LAB OF EUROPE (December 2017). 
34 YOUR TITLE [29-Nov-21 
the resilience gap generated by extreme income disparity. Qualifying recipients 
receive between €462 and €1015 per month.132 Recognizing that many workers 
in Spain work temporarily, the UBI plan excluded short-term work in the 
income means-test for determining eligibility. The plan was also designed to be 
responsive to changing economic needs, and legislators took the opportunity 
to address the particular economic and housing precarities experienced by 
women and girls, by waiving pre-existing conditions that typically disadvantage 
on the basis of gender.133 
 
One question that has been raised in the context of these initiatives is how 
states will offset new, unexpected expenditures brought on by the pandemic. 
In the U.K., Treasury reported a deficit of £337 Billion, making up 15% of the 
total UK GDP.134 Likewise, in Spain, where the pre-pandemic economy relied 
heavily on outside tourism, the economic impact of the pandemic has been 
severe. In the U.S., local and state governments feared massive tax shortfalls as 
normally reliable sales tax revenues flattened in 2020, reflecting lower 
consumer demand.135 U.S. state and local governments expected to counter the 
shortfalls through federal infrastructure funding, which aimed to bridge the 
spending gap through a series of redirections, reclamations, and delays on 
other spending priorities.136 In Argentina, the already cash-strapped 
government passed a one-time tax levy (up to 2%) on its wealthiest citizens 
(approximately 12,000 people), raising U.S.$3 billion to offset new costs 
associated with social distancing and social safety-net enhancements during the 
pandemic. In the short-term, governments have largely borne the fiscal costs 
of the pandemic, relying on forecast future economic growth to generate tax 
revenue which is hypothecated to fund current endeavors. This ‘tax increment 
financing’ strategy presumes that the future taxes collected on current 
investments will outpace the deficits over time.137 These strategies are often 
 
132 Jennifer Waidler & Maja Gavrilovic, From Crisis Comes Opportunity: Spain’s Basic Income Response to 
Covid-19, UNICEF CONNECT (July 1, 2020) [available at] https://blogs.unicef.org/evidence-for-
action/from-crisis-comes-opportunity-spains-basic-income-response-to-covid-19/.  
133 Id.  
134B. Peccarelli, What UK Taxes could be raised to cover Covid-driven spending, ITR (August 24, 2020) 
[available at] https://www.internationaltaxreview.com/article/b1n0qc7y0cttlh/what-uk-taxes-could-be-
raised-to-cover-covid-driven-spending 
135 H. Gillers & P. Santilli, States Expected Covid-19 to bring widespread tax shortfalls:L It didn’t happen 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 10, 2021) [available at] https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-expected-
covid-19-to-bring-widespread-tax-shortfalls-it-didnt-happen-11615372201 




137 M. Sandford & K. Muldoon-Smith, Covid-19 has emphasized the importance of the local state – but how to 
solve a problem like local government funding, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS POLICY BRIEF (May 7, 2020) 
[available at] https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/local-government-funding/. The National debt or 
deficit spending has often been maligned as irresponsible fiscal policy in austerity-promoting analysis.  
These views often draw on folksy common-sense rationales rather than on data, which suggests that 
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financialized through the bond market, where private investors lend money to 
the government at a fixed rate to enable the government to meet urgent 
spending demands. These dependencies, on economic growth and private 
investment to shore up the fiscal resilience of states, will impact on the 
background resilience of governments as states continue to adapt their 
strategies for mediating the immediate public health threats of the pandemic, 
and laying the foundations for economic recovery.    
 
B. Bringing homeless people into shelter 
 
The global shutdown and urgent ‘shelter in place’ directives re-framed 
political concepts of risk in relation to homeless populations and the 
precariously housed. Homelessness scholars and advocates have long argued 
that applying criminal justice or public order frames to homelessness—for 
example, regulating to punish homeless persons for sleeping in public 
spaces—fails to address the causes of homelessness. The embodiment of the 
human condition means that, inherently and unavoidably, everyone needs to 
‘be’ somewhere. As such, responses to homelessness based on deterrence—
when these do not also provide alternative shelter solutions—are simply 
ineffective: they are seeking to ‘move along’ people who have nowhere else to 
go.138 The rapid responses of governments that, faced with the public health 
crisis of the pandemic, intervened with funded initiatives to bring homeless 
people into shelter signaled that—notwithstanding homelessness policies that 
were notionally framed around deterrence and choice—the ‘no-choice’ nature 
of homelessness is fundamentally understood and accepted by policy-makers. 
As cities and states grappled with the imperatives of enforcing ‘shelter at 
home’ directives, punitive policies towards homeless people139 gave way to the 
more urgent narrative of public health.  
 
In the short term, some states took unprecedented steps to house 
homeless populations: providing rooms in vacant hotels,140 converting empty 
buildings into temporary accommodations,141 repurposing ghost towns to 
 
deficit spending as a product of economic opportunity fuels economic growth rather than limits it.  See J. 
Clingermayer, & B. Dan Wood,  Disentangling Patterns of State Debt Financing,  89 AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE REVIEW 108-120. (1995); Phillip Coggan, Does Govenrnment Debt Matter Anymore?, PROSPECT (May 
3, 2021) [available at] https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/does-government-debt-matter-
any-more-austerity-deficit-spending-borrowing.  
138 T. Mulvaney & J. Singer, ‘Move Along to Where? Property in Service of Democracy (A Tribute 
to André van der Walt)’ in G MULLER, R BRITS, B SLADE & J VAN WYK (EDS) TRANSFORMATIVE 
PROPERTY LAW, FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VAN DER WALT (2018, Cape Town: Juta), pp1-20. 
139 M. L. Roark, Homelessness at the Cathedral, 80 MISSOURI L. REV. 55, 128 (2015); J. Waldron, 
Homelessness and Community, 50 U. TORONTO L. JOURNAL 371 (2000).  
140 Alicia Victoria Lozano, California Fast Tracks Plans to House homeless residents amid Covid-19 outbreak , 
NBC NEWS (April 9, 2020) [available at] HTTPS://WWW.NBCNEWS.COM/NEWS/US-NEWS/CALIFORNIA-
FAST-TRACKS-PLANS-HOUSE-HOMELESS-RESIDENTS-AMID-COVID-19-N1179656  
141 Regions Shelter Homeless During Coronavirus lockdown, PROGRESSIVE SPAIN (March 24, 2020) 
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house homeless people,142 and in some local areas, reinvigorating ‘housing first’ 
plans to put homeless people in stable housing so that they could shelter in 
place with sufficient social distancing measures.143 In some places, state 
agencies took stock of empty properties, or places that had the potential to be 
empty, leveraging state resources to provide shelter for ‘at risk’ populations. In 
what was perhaps the most notable extension of the Overton window, 
governments commandeered empty buildings to bring homeless people off the 
streets and into safer environments.144 In Ireland, temporarily empty hotels 
were block-booked and a large amount of Airbnb accommodation—left empty 
as travel and tourism ceased—was leased by government-commissioned 
organizations to house homeless people. In England, an ‘Everyone In’ 
initiative, funded by the Government, block-booked empty hotels to house 
rough sleepers in the initial months of the pandemic. News media reported 
that, for one hotel in Manchester, about half of the homeless people who had 
stayed there under the ‘Everybody In’ initiative had been moved on to other 
accommodation, usually supported housing or temporary accommodation.  
 
Initiatives to bring homeless people into shelter were generally delivered 
through local authorities, under the political cover—enabled through 
allocations of funding and powers to act—of central or national governments. 
Central governments allocated political and economic resilience to local 
authorities, who provided front-line responses to the urgent local challenges of 
street homelessness during periods of lockdown. As with many aspects of 
initial state responses to the pandemic, there were significant local variations in 
the nature, extent and impact of these initiatives. In England, the Local 
Government Association—the national membership body for local 
authorities—commissioned a rapid report to identify lessons learnt from the 
‘Everyone In’ response to the COVID-19 crisis, across 343 local authorities: to 
inform future policies and practices to tackle rough sleeping and those at risk 




142 Juan Carlos De Santos Pascual, Spain’s Homeless Help Repopulate Rural Ghost Towns, EURO NEWS 
(December 31, 2020) [available at]  https://www.euronews.com/2020/12/30/spain-s-homeless-help-
repopulate-rural-ghost-towns 
143 One group known as WINNYC revealed in May 2020 its Aftermath Plan: Responding to Homelessness 
in the Wake of Covid-19.  The plan urged city, state and federal government to reinvest in housing 
resources that enabled precariously housed persons to remain housed during moments of crisis, target 
and identify families who have lost homes to find new housing resources, and develop new affordable 
housing measures to combat the increase in homelessness. See WINNYC, The Aftermath Plan: Responding to 
Homelessness in the Wake of Covid-19 (May 2020).  
144 See e.g., Cameron Parsell et al., (2020); Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, How 
States are Housing the Homeless During a Pandemic, ASTHO EXPERTS BLOG [available at] 
https://www.astho.org/StatePublicHealth/How-States-are-Housing-the-Homeless-During-a-Pandemic/05-20-20/ 
145 Lessons Learnt from Councils’ Response to Rough Sleeping During the Covid-19 Pandemic, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION (Nov. 19, 2020) [available at] 
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“The success of Everyone In demonstrates that, given the mandate and 
funding, councils, working with their partners, have the means to end the vast 
majority of rough sleeping.”  
 
This report identified key factors of success—including the importance of 
the commitments governments made to delivering a rapid and expansive 
response, targeted at people sleeping rough, and people living in unsafe 
conditions who were at risk of sleeping rough. Crucially, in England the 
initiative extended to include people who were not normally eligible for public 
services due to their immigration status. This can be contrasted with debates in 
the U.S. which continued to reference exclusionary tropes, such as whether 
non-citizens were entitled to state assistance.146 For the ‘Everyone In’ initiative, 
and through the lens of public health, the identity of the homeless person did 
not determine the offer of shelter and support. Other features of local 
schemes that were seen to have worked well in England included 
comprehensive needs assessment, including health, substance abuse and a 
focus on the specific needs of women; the use of hotel accommodation, giving 
homeless people important feelings of safety and self-worth; the presence of 
multi-agency services in the emergency accommodation, encouraging 
engagement with services; and rapid turnaround in ‘moving on’ the low-needs 
cohort. Where the initiative worked well, multi-agency partnership—across 
health, criminal justice, housing associations and the voluntary and charitable 
sectors—was a key enabler. The report found that this led to a better 
understanding between partners about what they each could do, and opened 
up future potential to bring together and allocate their respective resources in 
new ways. 
 
Where it worked well, the initiative also strengthened resilience between 
levels of government and across state agencies. The LGA report highlighted 
the positive impact of enhanced trust between councils operating across two-
tier geographies—where counties and districts with interdependent 
responsibilities had worked together both vertically and horizontally to secure 
the best outcomes. By utilizing the opportunities of new technologies to adopt 
new ways of working—for example, conducting remote meetings between 
agencies—the state’s capacity to meet the challenge of bringing homeless 
people into shelter was bolstered. In a study published in The Lancet, Lewer et 
al found that, while an estimated 24 homeless people died due to SARS-CoC-2 
 
https://www.local.gov.uk/publications/lessons-learnt-councils-response-rough-sleeping-during-covid-
19-pandemic.    
146 Felicia Persaud, The Public Charge Rule and Covid 19, The New York Amsterdam News (March 19, 
2020) at 14 (criticizing the failure of states and the Trump administration to specifically tailor messages to 
non-citizens, both documented and undocumented for how to access public services during the 
pandemic); H. Dilek, M. Tonyali, N. Çolapkulu, O. Alimiglu, The impact of Covid-19 on Ethnicity, Minorities 
and Immigrants: Are we all in the same ship, 42 CMJ REVIEW 236 (2020).  
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up to May 31st 2020, preventative policies implemented in the U.K. to protect 
the homeless population during the first wave of COVID-19 (between 
February and May 2020) were likely to have very significantly reduced the rate 
of infection for this population, preventing 21,092 infections, 266 deaths, 1164 
hospital admissions and 338 ICU admissions.147  
 
A major concern—with respect to much of this emergency provision—
was with what would happen once the initial funding ran out.148 Like many 
other aspects of the state’s response to the uncertainties of the pandemic, the 
time horizon of emergency policies continually shifted as the pandemic 
progressed. This created a ‘stop-start’ dynamic, with piecemeal policy updates 
routinely extended for a few months more as the expected end-date 
approached. In the U.K., the Government indicated that, by June 2020, local 
authorities had accommodated 14,610 people (although a significant 
proportion of these were not rough sleepers before the pandemic: some were 
brought into accommodation to enable greater social distancing than shelters 
or hostels could afford, and others to prevent them becoming rough sleepers). 
The U.K.’s central government allocated £3.2 billion to local authorities to 
allow them to meet local needs during the pandemic, including protecting the 
most vulnerable and rough sleepers. In June 2020, the Government 
announced an £85 million fund to provide emergency accommodation for 
5,400 rough sleepers to avoid them having to return the streets when hotels re-
opened for business.149 A further £433 million was committed: “…to provide 
6,000 long-term, safe homes to support thousands of rough sleepers currently 
housed in emergency accommodation to move on to more sustainable 
accommodation.”150 And in December 2020, the UK Government pledged a 
further £310 million to local authorities in 2021, targeted at areas with high 
numbers of homeless people, those at risk of homelessness or living in 
temporary accommodation. This was pitched as a £47m increase on the 2020 
budget for this part of the initiative and was described as part of an overall 
investment of more than £750 million to tackle homelessness and rough 
sleeping in 2021. By the end of 2020, the Government claimed to have helped 
 
147 D. Lewer, I. Braithwaite, M. Bullock, M.T. Eyre, P.J. White, R.W. Aldridge, A. Story & A.C. 
Hayward, COVID-19 among people experiencing homelessness in England: a modelling study, 8 LANCET RESPIR 
MED 1181 (2020). One report claimed that in Paris, where state responses were seen as less effective, 
40% of the homeless population was infected (Homelessness and COVID: High infection rates and social 
marginalisation haunts Paris’ homeless, EURONEWS (Feb. 3 2021) [available at]  
https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/03/homelessness-and-covid-high-infection-rates-and-social-
marginalisation-haunts-paris-homele. 
148  Homeless Figures and the Impact of Covid-19, FOCUS IRELAND [available at] 
https://www.focusireland.ie/homeless-figures-and-the-impact-of-covid-19/ 
149 Treasury announces £85m for rough sleeper accommodation THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2020) [available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/jun/24/treasury-announces-85m-for-rough-sleeper-
accommodation]. 
150  Id. 
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more than 29,000 vulnerable people, with two-thirds of these moved on to 
settled accommodation.151  
 
It is important to recognize that these emergency investments to tackle 
homelessness came on the heels of a decade of austerity. A report published in 
February 2020 highlighted increased demand for homelessness services over 
the last decade, in a context of austerity-era cuts to local authority budgets.152 
The Homelessness Reduction Act 2017 expanded local authorities’ legal duties 
for households who are homeless or at risk of homelessness, widening the 
pool of people entitled to receive support from local authorities in relation to 
their homelessness. However, the report found that, in the period immediately 
preceding the pandemic, local authority expenditure on homelessness related 
services was significantly lower than it had been a decade previously. It argued 
that, if local authorities were going to meet the Government’s manifesto 
commitment to end rough sleeping by 2024, they would require sufficient 
funding and an assurance that future funding would be guaranteed in the long 
term; as well as clear direction to ensure that funding was focused on 
homelessness and not diverted to other local priorities.   
 
Although bringing homeless people into shelter was a common feature of 
state responses to the pandemic, the approach adopted in specific initiatives 
varied depending on the jurisdiction—with a range of approaches and degrees 
of success both between and within nation states. In the U.S., there was no 
national initiative to bring the homeless into shelters, and there was significant 
variation in approaches as states, cities and local authorities experimented with 
different policy options.153 This reflects the different scales of response that 
can be undertaken in the U.S., by local municipalities versus federal or regional 
authorities. Many cities and states across the U.S. took extraordinary measures 
to get homeless persons off the streets and into viable housing. One homeless 
 
151 UK Government Press Release, Government pledges further £310 million to tackle homelessness (Dec. 21 
2020) [available at] 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-pledges-further-310-million-to-tackle-
homelessness. An evaluation of responses to homelessness and rough sleeping during the pandemic, 
published by the London School of Economics, noted that—as is often the case in relation to official 
data on homelessness—the statistics published by the Government may not have presented a wholly 
accurate picture. For example, the count of homeless people supported may have been skewed where 
people left emergency shelters voluntarily, and then re-presented (perhaps multiple times); and they 
included an unknown proportion of people who were already ‘in the system’; C. Whitehead, K. Scanlon, 
A. Edge, N. Holman, M. Rotolo & F. Blanc, Homelessness and rough sleeping in the time of COVID-19’ (May 5 
2021) LSE London,[available at]  https://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/publications/homelessness-and-
rough-sleeping-in-the-time-of-covid-19/. 
152 WPI Economics, Local authority spending on homelessness: 2020 update (February 2020). 
https://www.homeless.org.uk/sites/default/files/site-
attachments/Local%20authority%20homelessness%20spending%202020.pdf.  
153 The U.K.’s Local Government Association commissioned a review of lessons learned from the 
Everyone In response to the COVID-19 crisis in dealing with rough sleeping and those at risk of it and 
how this can inform future policy and practice.  See Lessons Learned (November 19, 2020).  
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advocate in San Francisco observed that the pandemic had revealed the depth 
of inequalities between those who are sheltered and those who are not: “The 
very visual impact of wealth disparity that homelessness brings to the table has 
[been magnified] because we’re talking about municipal governments asking 
everyone to shelter in place and they have thousands of people without an 
ability to shelter in place.”154  
 
As cities and states mobilized to protect homeless people, it was clear that 
the homeless population was not only extremely vulnerable to the disease, a 
threat to others: as ‘vectors’ of infection. When the U.K.’s Housing Minster 
wrote to local government officers to explain the measures that central 
government was asking local authorities to deliver, he explained that: 
“The Government was aware of the need to prevent displacement 
and homelessness, in the light of the public health risk this poses in 
relation to the spread of infection, and to reduce pressures on essential 
public services during this time….The Government’s primary 
consideration is public health and the potential strain on…an already 
overstretched National Health Service and local authority services.”155 
In the U.S., this public health risk framing enabled Federal Authorities, 
Cities and States to take measures previously unthought-of to ensure that 
homeless people did not exacerbate the spread of the disease. Typically, 
disaster relief shelters utilize large, open spaces, where many people are 
gathered temporarily until other accommodations can be arranged. Many 
homeless shelters follow this model, providing large auditorium-like spaces 
where cots, mats, or other temporary bedding can shelter hundreds of people 
at a time. Covid-19 forced policy makers to rethink this strategy, as both 
FEMA,156 and the governors of several states, authorized funding to provide 
for “non-congregant” shelters, or shelters that provided individualized private 
closed off spaces to prevent further spread of the disease.157 The State of 
California and the State of Louisiana housed homeless people in hotel rooms 
to reduce their exposure—and the risk that they would spread infection—in 
(crowded) shelters or on the streets.158 The New Hampshire Governor took 
 
154 Catherine Kim, It Took a Pandemic for Cities to Finally Address Homelessness, VOX (April 21, 2020), 
[available at] https://www.vox.com/2020/4/21/21227629/coronavirus-homeless-covid-19-las-vegas-
san-francisco 
155 Letter from Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to local authorities (September 7 
2020) [available at] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-act-2020-residential-
tenancies-protection-from-eviction-amendment-england-regulations-2020-letter-to-local-authorities.  
156 See FEMA Policy 104-009-18 (Version 3), FEMA Emergency Non-Congregate Sheltering 
During the Covid-19 Public Health Emergency (Interim) (June 1, 2020 – June 30, 2021).   
157 Governors in Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Ohio, and Vermont issued executive orders to 
identify non-congregant housing options for individuals experiencing homelessness or unable to safely 
self-quarantine. Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, How States are Housing the Homeless 
During a Pandemic, ASTHO EXPERTS BLOG [available at] https://www.astho.org/StatePublicHealth/How-States-
are-Housing-the-Homeless-During-a-Pandemic/05-20-20/ 
158 Other cities chose not to bring homeless people indoors: for example, Las Vegas used a public 
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the extra step in ordering that all hotel space be used only for emergency non-
congregate housing or emergency workers.159 Additional resources were also 
directed to target assets of resilience towards protection of women against 
domestic violence in shelters, funds for food and transportation during the 
lock down, and additional funding for health providers providing services to 
homeless populations.  
 
In Ireland, the coincidence of a national General Election in the Spring of 
2020 added immediate political weight to public assessments of the state’s 
response. The housing and homelessness crisis was already a major issue going 
into this election, and the prospect of immediate electoral implications brought 
the Government’s political self-interest in responding to the property 
dimensions of the crisis into sharp relief. As we have noted elsewhere in the 
book, the Irish Government was already under significant pressure from 
activists and social movements to tackle the housing and homelessness crises 
that had endured since the 2008 ‘Great Recession’ burst the remnants of the 
‘Celtic Tiger’ bubble. In Spring 2021, the Chief Executive of one of Dublin’s 
homelessness charities was quoted in The Irish Times as observing that the 
coronavirus pandemic: “…had provided a ‘hidden opportunity’ for homeless 
services, allowing them to move more people off the streets and into 
housing.”160 While responses that utilized vacant hotel or AirBnB rooms were 
heavily reliant on vacancies opened up by the impact of lockdowns on 
tourism, other interventions—including supported housing and physical 
modification and different ways of working within shelter accommodation—
were potentially more sustainable. Pleace et al noted that in Ireland—where the 
state has come under major social movement pressure to tackle housing over 
the last decade—homelessness policy was already undergoing a sustained 
transition towards greater use of prevention and housing-led/Housing First 
services.161 Pleace et al suggested that, where the pandemic accelerated an 
approach that was already underway, this was more likely to create more 
sustainable solutions.162       
 
 
parking area with sections taped off to create safe outdoor sleeping spaces for homeless in their 
community. 
159 New Hampshire Governor Emergency Order No. 27, Restriction of Hotels and Other Lodging 
providers to provision of lodging for vulnerable populations and essential workers (March 13, 2020).  
160 Covid-19 a ‘hidden opportunity’ for homelessness services THE IRISH TIMES (April 1, 2021) [available at] 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/covid-19-a-hidden-opportunity-for-homeless-services-
1.4526596.  
161 M. ALLEN, L. BENJAMINSEN & V. BUSCH-GEERTSEMA, ENDING HOMELESSNESS IN DENMARK, 
FINLAND AND IRELAND (Bristol: Policy Press, 2020)  cited in N. Pleace, I. Baptista, L. Benjaminsen, V. B. 
Geertsema, E. O’Sullivan & N. Teller, European Homelessness and COVID 19 (March 2021) [available at] 
https://www.feantsaresearch.org/public/user/Observatory/2021/European_Homlessness_and_COVI
D-19Web_(1).pdf.    
162 Pleace et al, (2021) id., p31. 
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In March 2021, the European Observatory on Homelessness published an 
initial analysis evaluating the short-term, and potential long-term, effects of 
COVID-19 on homelessness and housing exclusion.163 The report concluded 
that while: “…there are many reasons to be concerned about the current state 
of homelessness policies, especially in light of a pandemic…there are also 
reasons to be hopeful.”164 Their multi-state analysis noted that, over the period 
of the pandemic, countries across Europe and elsewhere had modified their 
homelessness interventions. Many European countries managed to get most 
homeless people off the street into safe accommodation in record time; many 
‘night-only’ shelters had been converted to 24/7 shelters, with more single 
occupancy rooms made available; and there was a significant shift towards 
housing-led and ‘Housing First’ approaches to homelessness.165 With 
significant numbers of homeless people brought off the streets: 
“[o]n a temporary basis, the ‘complex’ problem of street 
homelessness was largely and rapidly stopped. While there were still 
operational problems and, sometimes, an absence of a clear strategy to 
prevent an eventual return to the streets, there were also reports of 
gains in wellbeing and health as people who had been experiencing 
street homelessness were moved into hotels.”166  
While some of these jurisdictions had already adopted housing-led 
strategies before the pandemic, in others—such as England—the pandemic 
triggered a sudden and significant shift to a new policy paradigm.  
 
Of course, it is important not to under-estimate the challenges (and costs) 
of delivering on commitments to support rough sleepers into accommodation, 
either in the emergency context of the pandemic, or into the longer term, and 
the ‘success’ of these initiatives is yet to be fully evaluated.167 The scale of 
responses reflected concerns that widespread infection amongst the homeless 
population would accelerate the spread of contagion across the population as a 
whole, with the prospect that once the immediate risk of infection has 
passed—and with that, the immediate threat to state resilience—governments 
would roll back on political support and commitments to adequate long-term 
funding. Pleace et al speculated that:  
“There is the possibility that some EU Member States and other 
 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 4. 
165 Id. (“The Corona-crisis made abundantly clear that access to adequate and affordable housing is 
the best protection against the virus, and that housing people experiencing homelessness is the most 
logical public health intervention.”) 
166 Id. at 7.  
167 The official narrative surrounding the U.K. Government’s initiative was: “to offer 
accommodation to as many rough sleepers as possible in order to help them stay safe during the 
pandemic.” (Statement by Luke Hall, M.P., Minister for Rough Sleeping and Housing, U.K. 
Parliamentary business, Written Questions and Answers and Written Statements, Rough Sleeping: 
COVID-19 Response: Written Statement – HCWS263 (03 June 2020).  
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European countries will simply ‘switch off’ specific measures at a given 
point, ending eviction bans and extra support for people experiencing 
street homelessness in an unplanned way, leading to sudden, perhaps 
significant, spikes in homelessness. However, much depends on how 
these policies are wound down and, as appears to be the case for a few 
EU Member States, whether the pandemic has prompted a wider re-
think of homelessness policy, prompting reorientation towards more 
integrated housing-led/Housing First strategies that are likely to 
produce sustained falls in homelessness.”168  
Sustainable solutions to street homelessness will require infrastructure and 
significant investment in affordable, secure homes, in a period when some 
countries are likely to be facing post-pandemic economic problems. From the 
vantage point of 2021, it remains unclear how sustainable initiatives to shelter 
homeless populations will be in each jurisdiction. Equally, however, it remains 
to be seen what the impact of the economic crises triggered by the pandemic 
will be on the scale of the problem, and what fresh threats this may present for 
governments seeking to restore, and maintain, political, economic and social 
equilibrium. 
 
From a Resilient Property perspective, the political, economic, and social 
pressures brought to bear on states; and, crucially, political and public attitudes 
to social and economic hardship after the pandemic in each jurisdiction; will 
shape the window of political possibility in relation to property, housing and 
shelter in the wake of the pandemic. To the extent that the allocation of 
resilience to homeless people aligns with the national mood in some 
jurisdictions in the post-pandemic period, state action to tackle 
homelessness—for example, through sustained public investment in housing-
led services for homeless people—may remain a political possibility. At the 
very least, the disruption of pre-pandemic narratives: individualized 
responsibility for homelessness, the non-responsibility of states, and the 
‘unsolvable’ nature of street homelessness; are important legacies of the 
pandemic. Echoing our discussion in previous chapters, Pleace al explained 
that:  
“The problem of people experiencing street homelessness, so often 
presented as ‘complex’ and hence ‘difficult’ to resolve, using a very 
longstanding political narrative of ‘high and complex’ individual needs 
needing to be met, while the effects of multiple systemic failures across 
economy, society, and the State were downplayed was suddenly 
addressed through increased public spending. ‘Everyone In’ very 
rapidly cleared the streets of people experiencing street homelessness 
and, for the most part, appears to have kept them in the hotels and 
 
168 Pleace et al (2021) at 8. 
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temporary accommodation that was employed for the purpose. The 
specialist taskforce, set up to orchestrate the next phase, has been 
working with local authorities and the homelessness sector to ensure 
those accommodated through ‘Everyone In’ are helped into longer-
term accommodation, with a stated goal that as few people as possible 
return to life on the streets. This policy is radical because it undermines 
earlier government narratives that street-based homelessness was a 
‘complex’ social problem which was used to explain why levels were 
increasing, drawing attention away from expenditure cuts and other 
systemic drivers of street-based homelessness and because the 
Government itself claims that it appears to be working.”169 
Reflecting on parallel initiatives in Australia, Parsell et al argued that the re-
framing of homelessness through the public health lens—re-defining active 
state responses to tackle homelessness as essential to the goal of containing 
COVID-19—“[broke] with the prevailing neoliberal/individualizing 
framework that has dominated homelessness policy in recent decades.”170 
Rough sleepers were re-cast as people who were ‘at risk’, and who needed 
state-funded support to keep them (and others) safe. The framing of 
homelessness changed: from public order to safety; punishment to support; an 
individual failing to a collective, public challenge. Policy initiatives that had 
previously been ‘unthinkable’ in terms of political viability and popular support 
were rapidly implemented, with widespread support. The nomos (or ‘normative 
universe’) within which state responses are formulated and implemented 
changed, and states pivoted in response.  
 
C. Moratoria on tenancy evictions and mortgage repossessions 
 
In parallel to the launch of major programs of fiscal support, furlough 
payments and shelter for homeless populations, states also acted swiftly to 
extend temporary protections to mortgagors and tenants to protect against the 
risk of evictions for non-payment of rent. Concerns about widespread 
evictions due to lost economic opportunities during the pandemic triggered 
eviction bans in many states. These frequently applied to both rental evictions 
and mortgage repossessions or foreclosures, with legal remedies that owners 
(for example, landlords) and creditors (mortgagees) were normally entitled to 
exercise to recover their properties following non-payment restricted or 
withdrawn. Landlords and creditors were prevented from evicting precariously 
housed tenants who defaulted on rent or mortgages due to Covid-19. In some 
cases, eviction moratoria did not excuse the payment of rent, but merely stayed 
the enforcement mechanism (eviction); although some states intervened to 
limit the accrual of liabilities.   
 
169 Id, at 33. 
170 Parsell et al (2020) at 5. 
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The moratoria on evictions were temporary—and often extended 
piecemeal as the pandemic continued. In the U.S., at least six different 
approaches to eviction moratoria were implemented by state, local and federal 
authorities.   
1. The most basic step was the de facto moratorium on evictions that 
resulted from the closure of courts. Nineteen states took no direct 
action at the level of the state to pass legislation or otherwise order 
a moratorium on evictions, but the closing of courts due to 
lockdowns effectively halted temporarily evictions: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
Wyoming.  
2. In these states, there were also some limitations on evictions 
because of the federal CARES Act, (which included a limited 
moratorium on evictions for economically vulnerable persons) or 
the CDC’s Public Health State of Emergency, which limited 
evictions on public health grounds. Both moratoria were limited to 
those cases in which individuals were unable to pay rent due to the 
economic downturn and who had no other shelter options 
available to them. One state (Colorado) imposed by law a 
requirement that landlords inform tenants of Federal Relief 
Programs under the CARES Act or the CDC Emergency Public 
Health Order as a requirement for proceeding with an eviction. 
Oklahoma and Kentucky further limited state eviction protections 
to only those that would qualify for protection under either the 
CARES Act or the CDC moratorium.  
3. Thirty states imposed their own moratoria on eviction, proceedings 
to enforce evictions or collection of fines relating to non-payment 
of rent: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware (may file but are stayed), District of Columbia, Florida, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington. 
4. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, and California imposed an additional 
moratorium on utility shut offs for non-payment. 
5. Maine and Michigan extended the time periods for notice and cure 
of eviction proceedings, giving tenants more time to pay up rent 
liabilities accrued during the pandemic.  
6. Delaware allowed landlords to continue to file eviction proceedings 
but stayed enforcement until after the emergency period ended.  
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Across the U.S., many of the orders contained common language: for 
example, explicitly stating that the moratorium only applied to evictions linked 
to for non-payment of rent due to pandemic-related economic hardship. Some 
stipulated other reasons why tenants could be evicted, including damaging the 
property, committing violence against another resident or the landlord, or if 
the landlord or their family required the property for use as a primary 
residence. While many of the orders disallowed the imposition of fines or 
penalties for nonpayment of rent, and even extended the period in which rent 
would be deemed to be delinquent, orders also commonly reiterated that they 
did not forgive or alleviate the obligation to pay rent, or past amounts owed to 
the landlord. In September 2020, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
issued a nationwide moratorium, through December 31, 2020, on certain 
evictions as a public health measure. The order applied to tenants who either 
earned less than $99,000 individually or $198,000 in 2019 as a married couple; 
who were not required to report income to the Internal Revenue Service in 
2019; or who received an Economic Impact Payment under the Cares Act. 
The CDC also required that recipients had used best efforts to attain 
government assistance for housing; were able to certify that they were unable 
to pay rent due to a substantial loss of income; were making best efforts to 
make a timely payment of rent; and would become homeless or need to move 
into a shared living setting if they were evicted.  
 
In England, notice periods on rented housing were extended;171 and all 
possession proceedings were stayed, initially until at least 20th September 
2020.172 After the initial stay on possession proceedings (arguably, to protect the 
resilience of the court system) expired, landlords were permitted to progress 
their claims through the courts, with courts directed to prioritize ‘the most 
egregious cases, such as those involving anti-social behavior and other 
crimes.’173 When a third lockdown was extended from early January 2021 to 
June 2021, the eviction ban (residential and commercial) was reinstated until 
31st May 2021, and then further extended to 20th September 2021. While 
bailiffs were (until 31 May 2021) barred by legislation from serving eviction 
notices or carrying out evictions (tenant or mortgage repossessions), there 
were also exceptions for: ‘the most serious circumstances that present the 
most strain on landlords’:174 “illegal occupation, false statement, anti-social 
behavior, perpetrators of domestic violence in the social rented sector, where a 
 
171 Coronavirus Act 2020, Schedule 29. 
172 Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) (Coronavirus) Rules 2020 S.I. 2020/582; Civil Procedure 
(Amendment no. 5) (Coronavirus) Rules 2020 S.I. 2020/889; Hackney LBC v Okoro [2020] EWCA Civ 
681.  
173 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Guidance for Landlords and tenants (July 
20, 2021) [available at] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-and-renting-guidance-
for-landlords-tenants-and-local-authorities/coronavirus-covid-19-guidance-for-landlords-and-tenants  
174 Id.  
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property is unoccupied following the death of a tenant, and serious rent arrears 
of more than 6 months.”175  
 
One consequence of the eviction bans in England was that that, by 
September 2021, almost no legal evictions had taken place; and there was little 
evidence of illegal evictions.176 A key concern in relation to the temporary 
nature of eviction bans was the risk of a ‘tsunami’ of evictions once the bans 
are lifted—although Whitehead and Holman, evaluating the likely impact of 
lifting the ban in England suggested that limits on court capacity to process 
significantly higher volumes of eviction cases would likely result in a ‘slow 
burn’ rather than an explosion of evictions.177 In July 2020, UK housing charity 
Crisis published a report reflecting on the impact of the pandemic crisis 
response, and possible exit strategies.178 They noted that, while the ‘Everyone 
In’ initiative had been associated with very low levels of infection amongst 
homeless people, and the speed and clarity of the early Government response 
had ensured an effective public health strategy for this vulnerable population, 
there was cause for concern that a spike in family homelessness would follow 
as the evictions ban and financial support (for example, the furlough scheme) 
came to an end.179 The Crisis report urged the Government to keep additional 
protections in place, to avoid a new eviction and homelessness crisis once 
emergency measures were lifted.  
 
While CDC and federal legislation afforded temporary relief from eviction 
to some occupiers, many in the U.S. were similarly concerned that a ‘ticking 
time-bomb’ awaits tenants when those moratoria lift, and accrued rent or 
mortgage payments owed become actionable through eviction. Indeed, as 
temporary moratoria on eviction come to an end, many were concerned that 
the legacies of the pandemic would further deepen the affordable housing 
crisis. One analysis indicated that: “nearly 12 million U.S. renters were 
expected to owe an average of almost $6,000 in late rent and utility payments 
per household by January 2021.”180 Some U.S. states offered rental assistance 
 
175 Id. In June 2021, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government issued updated 
guidance for landlords and tenants, requiring (in most cases) four months’ notice to quit, dropping to 
two months from 1 August 2021—except for the ‘most serious’ cases. One difference between the 2021 
Regulations (Public Health (Coronavirus) (Protection from Eviction) (England) Regulations 2021) and 
the 2020 Regulations was that the ‘substantial rent arrears’ exception to the ban was reduced from 9 
months to 6 months. With no stipulation as to when these arrears accrued, a claim for possession could 
be based on 6 months of arrears accrued during the pandemic.  
176 C. Whitehead & N. Holman, Evictions: where are we now? What needs to change?,  
https://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/news/evictionswherearewenow/  
177 Id.   
178 Crisis, Homelessness Monitor England 2020: Covid-19 Crisis Response Briefing (July 2020) [available at] 
https://www.thinkhouse.org.uk/site/assets/files/2188/crisis0820.pdf.  
179 Id.   
180 Abby Vesoulis, Millions of Tenants Behind on Rent, small landlords Struggling, Eviction Moratoriums 
Expiring Soon: Inside the Next Housing Crisis, TIME (February 18, 2021) available at 
48 YOUR TITLE [29-Nov-21 
programs for tenants who were financially impacted by the pandemic.181  
 
Activists, advocates and social movements articulated demands for 
sustained solutions to housing precarity, framing moratoria on evictions, 
suspension of mortgage payments and provision of shelter for the most 
vulnerable on Airbnb or hotel rooms as precedents for what could be achieved 
in the post-pandemic social struggle.182 We have noted that, in the initial stage 
of the pandemic, the framing of the crisis as a public health challenge 
reopened ‘spaces of contestation’ that were previously regarded as closed 
(viewed as outside the ‘Overton window’). Social movements articulated 
concerns about ongoing housing shortages and precarity. For example, in May 
2020, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty released a four 
page fact sheet titled Racisms, Homelessness and Covid-19 in which it 
highlighted the intersections between these two problems in communities of 
color in the U.S. The fact sheet provided details explaining why how people of 
color are particularly impacted by housing costs, lack of access to healthcare, 
housing precarity and homelessness, and articulated key demands that 
advocates should make on state and local officials.183 Many of these demands 
 
https://time.com/5940505/housing-crisis-2021/.  
181 Nine states provided for supplemental support for at risk renters to assist with paying rent: Iowa, 
Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. 
182 L. Mendes, How can we Quarantine without a Home? Responses of Activism and Urban Social Movements in 
Times of Covid-19 Pandemic Crisis in Lisbon, 111 J. OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY 318, 327-38 
(2020).  
183 Id. These included:  
• Actions that support people experiencing homelessness, who are 
disproportionately Black and people of color: 
- House people experiencing homelessness in hotels, motels and/or RVs for the 
duration of the crisis, and plan now for permanent housing after the crisis 
ends. 
- Place moratoria on sweeping encampments, seizing tents, and enforcing laws 
prohibiting resting and sheltering oneself in public space. 
- Place moratoria on vehicle ticketing, towing and impoundment. 
- Immediately and safely decrease the number of people incarcerated for laws 
criminalizing homelessness and other non-violent offenses. 
- Schools and universities must take students experiencing homelessness into 
account as they close down, including ensuring students have the necessary 
tools to complete schoolwork remotely. 
- Ensure that any emergency cash relief measures designed to assist people with 
the economic impact of the Coronavirus crisis are also made available to and 
reach people experiencing homelessness. 
• Require public collection of data on COVID-19 cases and deaths by race and 
ethnicity on federal, state, and local levels. Some states and cities are still not 
publishing racial and ethnic data on COVID-19 cases and deaths. 
• Ensure adequate access to testing among communities of color. 
• Implement rent relief: Eviction and rent moratoriums help with keeping 
families in their homes during the crisis, but do not necessarily ensure families’ 
housing security once the crisis is over. 
• Paid sick leave and paid family medical leave. 
• Provide hazard pay for essential workers. 
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were addressed in federal or state policies, in some form. However, 
commitments to sustaining these measures waned as the crisis shifted from 
public health to an economic crisis.  
 
Rachael Walsh has described how, alongside eviction bans, legislative 
intervention to prevent rent increases during Ireland’s first lockdown: 
“mobiliz[ed] political support for a less conservative attitude towards the 
protection of property rights.”184 Rent control has been a controversial issue in 
Ireland since two Supreme Court decisions185 in the 1980s cast doubts on the 
constitutionality of such measures. Indeed, against the backdrop of the pre-
pandemic, post-2008 housing and homelessness crises, political resistance to 
such policies remained strong, with opposition justified on the grounds that 
prohibitions on rent increases were likely to be unconstitutional. Walsh 
explained that “[t]he Covid-19 crisis apparently prompted politicians to 
reconsider their views on the constitutional parameters for legislative 
interventions that balance legal protections for landlords and tenants.” In 
analyzing how the Residential Tenancies and Valuation Act 2020 (apparently 
successfully) navigated this constitutional risk, Walsh highlighted the 
background resilience of landlords as a group: “that grup was large and 
apparently well-positioned to defend its interests politically…the Irish 
Supreme Court in 2005 suggested that the property rights of vulnerable, 
politically weak group should receive particularly strong legal protection.” 
Although subsequent interventions placed greater emphasis on potential 
hardship for landlords, Walsh suggested that: “…most fundamentally, the 
Covid-19 crisis may prove to be a turning point in softening political views on 
the strength of constitutional property rights, paving the way fo a better 
alignment of Irish housing law and policy with…the common good and social 
justice.” 
  
In Barcelona, media linked the resumption of evictions once the ban was 
lifted to a rise in suicides. As Spain continued to grapple with the legacies of 
the 2008 housing crisis, unemployment and precarious housing had depleted 
the resilience of economically marginalized populations. The pandemic 
afforded some temporary relief from evictions. Court closures left owners 
unable to exercise their legal power to evict tenants. In addition to protections 
against possession actions, Spain adopted a moratorium on mortgage 
payments. Private rental tenancy agreements due to end during the crisis were 
 
• Reduce jail and prison populations and ensure that those who are released can 
access non-congregate living situations. 
184 R. Walsh, ‘Securing Possession of the Home in the COVID-19 context: The Irish experience’ in 
ZT Boggenpoel, E van der Sijde, MT Tlale & S Mahomedy (ed) Property Responses to a Global Pandemic, 
(forthcoming, Juta, 2021).  
185 Blake v Attorney General [1982] IR 117 and Re Article 26 and the Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Bill 
1981 [1983] IR 181. 
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extended by six months; a ban on tenancy evictions was introduced; rents were 
frozen and in some cases (for landlords who owned 10 properties or more) 
reduced; and renters were provided with access to government-backed bank 
loans to help them to pay rent.186 However, these protections were not 
available to all: while the moratorium protected those who lost income due to 
the pandemic, it did not protect those who were previously unemployed. 
Indeed, in the last three months of 2020, with the country was still deep into 
the pandemic’s second wave, 11,202 evictions were carried out, many of which 
were in the Catalan Region, which includes the City of Barcelona.  
 
This gap in the protection program was highlighted when a 60-year-old 
Ecuadorian immigrant living in Barcelona committed suicide after receiving an 
eviction notice. Although he had been unemployed for two years, and was 
dependent on food banks for subsistence, he did not fit the vulnerability 
criteria laid out in the state’s pandemic protection program.187 While people 
whose housing claims were precarious before the pandemic were equally 
vulnerable to eviction during the pandemic, extending the eviction ban beyond 
the limits set out in the legislation would have risked disrupting the 
commitments the state had made pre-pandemic. While the Irish Government 
adapted its position on rent control, the Spanish state responded to pressures 
to maintain these commitments. This curtailed its scope for innovation during 
the crises, with consequences that in turn generated new pressures and strains, 
as political leaders were judged by the human-impacts of their decisions, in the 
new context of public attitudes and opinions.  
 
IV. Property, Crises and Equilibrium 
 
By early summer 2021, with vaccination programs underway in the US, the 
UK, Ireland, Spain and South Africa, and the end of the pandemic seemingly 
in sight, states began to transition from emergency measures to business as 
usual. With eviction moratoria in the U.S. either ended or due to come to an 
end by June 30, 2021, the focus turned to the aftermath of the pandemic for 
housing and property claims, in the context of the economic crisis and the 
need to stabilize the economy. A new set of questions emerged concerning 
legal recourse for landlords and creditors in relation to accruals of unpaid rent. 
In early 2021, Congress passed a $1.9 trillion ‘American Rescue Plan’ to 
provide many Americans with an additional $1400 one time relief payment, 
while setting aside funding for schools, vaccine programs, and direct payments 
 
186 J Simpson, ‘How Europe’s housing sector has responded to the COVID-19 crisis’ (25 May 
2020), Inside Housing. 
187 S. Burgen, Barcelona Mayor Calls for Rethink on Evictions in Wake of Suicides, THE GUARDIAN (June 
15, 2021) [Available at] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/15/barcelona-mayor-calls-for-
rethink-on-evictions-in-wake-of-
suicides?fbclid=IwAR3tbE6ceNSddO5eduS4c4ML8o3K8DkLxgduhPfb9uNX8SRGxUyO04_09TA. 
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to cities that were facing significant budgetary shortfalls to fund key 
infrastructure needs, such as police and fire protection, transit, and libraries. By 
May 2021, the U.S. had fully vaccinated nearly 40% of the adult population 
(125,453,423 Americans), while nearly 50% of the adult population had 
received at least one dose of a vaccine. In Spain, the national state of 
emergency—which provided the legal authority for curfews, lockdowns, and 
other measures that constrained individuals’ civil liberties—expired on May 3, 
2021. However, on the eve of the state of emergency being lifted, the Deputy 
Prime Minister indicated that regional authorities could seek permission from 
the court to re-impose follow-on restraints. At the same time, the Spanish 
government extended protections for vulnerable tenants and homeowners at 
risk of eviction (previously linked to the state of emergency) through to 
August 9, 2021.188  
 
State responses to the property crises of the pandemic can be 
conceptualized in terms of distinct phases. The first phase was defined by the 
immediate public health crisis: in a context of global ‘lockdowns’, many states 
took radical steps to bring the homeless into shelter and to ban tenancy 
and/or mortgage evictions. While government initiatives to keep people in 
their homes, and to bring the homeless into shelter, had a significant impact in 
preserving the health and wellbeing of homeless and precariously housed 
people, these measures were not exclusively—or perhaps even primarily—
motivated by the need to protect the resilience of homeless or precariously 
people themselves. In many places, the ‘public health crisis’ lens rapidly 
converted previously ‘unthinkable’ policy interventions into viable policy 
options—because the resilience needs of homeless and precariously housed 
people had become aligned with the resilience needs of the wider community 
and governments themselves. Contrasting the unprecedented scale of 
commitment, investment and ambition demonstrated by governments such as 
those in the U.K., U.S. and elsewhere to tackling homelessness and housing 
precarity during the pandemic with the ‘policy statis and poverty of ambition’ 
that characterized state responses to homelessness in the decade before the 
pandemic,189 Parcell et al observed that: “…the potential impact of the disease 
on the health of the homeless is not the sole driver of these drastic 
interventions; rather, it is the risk that their heightened vulnerability to 
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However, as the public health crisis receded, and the homelessness crisis, 
eviction crisis, property crisis and post-pandemic economic crisis was 
foregrounded, the state’s resilience needs were re-calibrated, creating new 
policy imperatives. A second phase, overlapping with the first, emerged as 
states transitioned from ‘lockdown’ to ‘re-opening’. For many, this included 
the re-opening of courts and resumption of evictions, enforcement and bailiff 
procedures—raising questions about the impacts of a return to ‘normal’ 
enforcement practices for evictions, repossessions, and foreclosures. Without 
the state-backed resilience of the eviction ban, the vulnerability of households 
that were already in a precarious financial position prior to the pandemic; or 
those who had lost income and accumulated housing debt during the 
pandemic; and who were unable to sustain their housing costs was exposed. A 
key consideration in this second phase concerned which types of response 
were most likely to generate resilience for states that are seeking economic 
recovery.  
 
The state’s ability to be responsive to new challenges in times of crises 
(such as mobilizing resources to address housing shortages even for a short 
time) requires flexibility, adaptation, recovery, and innovation. In this recovery 
phase, a crucial question facing city, local, regional and national authorities was 
which adjustments were temporary—time-limited to the immediate public 
health crisis; and which adjustments or commitments would have an ongoing 
impact beyond this initial period—becoming part of the ‘new normal’. Jason 
Hackworth has argued that the ‘Overton window’ of U.S. urban politics 
shifted dramatically to the political right following the 2008 housing crisis: 
normalizing the “entrepreneurial state” and moving the political debate to 
question whether the state had any role to play in managing urban affairs. 
Hackworth described the role of policy think-tanks in “…shift[ing] the policy 
dialogue to the right to make once unrealistic policy ideas possible, or if they 
are really successful, inevitable.”191 Likewise, in the U.K., Ireland, Spain and 
elsewhere, neoliberal-leaning governments responded to the 2008 housing and 
financial crisis with ‘austerity policies’.192 These resonated with transnational 
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trends of urban restructuring around a: “rentist, extractivist, and predatory 
model of austerity urbanism that generated numerous phenomena of 
accumulation by dispossession taking advantage of capital gains produced by 
an overheated housing market…”193  
 
Around the world, social movements mobilized against these austerity 
responses, arguing that pre-pandemic housing crises were produced by policies 
of: “transactional gentrification, real estate speculation, and financialization of 
housing.” However, and notwithstanding the scale of global visibility achieve 
by movements like Occupy, the impact of these groups in achieving lasting 
change—in moving the Overton window of political possibility—was 
dissipated by the persuasive power of the “think tanks, banks, corporations, 
and advocacy groups…advanc[ing] a disembedded market agenda.”194 Those 
who opposed the social movements’ agendas in favor of market-led 
approaches were: “far more organized, funded, numerous and established than 
the forces seeking to advance postcapitalist solutions…”195 Yet, 
notwithstanding limited success in achieving their goals in the Great Recession 
period, these same social movements, which had organized around affordable 
housing policy, anti-austerity, and rising inequalities in the pre-pandemic 
period, provided the early critiques that framed the scale of the property 
challenges triggered by the pandemic as a reflection of failed housing and 
austerity policies over the previous ten years.    
 
The global pandemic revealed the capacity for states to respond in flexible 
ways, at least temporarily, to particular problems. However, that ability to be 
flexible may be conditional on the ‘public health’ frame. As states attempt to 
return to a state of normalcy, and to lay the foundations for economic 
recovery in the face of recession and economic downturn following the 
pandemic, it is not yet clear whether the experience of the crises—the 
widening of the Overton window—will have a lasting impact on the property 
nomos, property politics and property law. Of course, the nature and scale of 
any lasting impacts is likely to vary by jurisdiction—contextualized by the 
(evolving) national nomos, and by political and public responses across national 
jurisdictions (national, state/regional, city/local).  
 
A key question in this phase, as states/governments work to recover 
political and economic equilibrium, concerns the potential scope for state 
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actors to anticipate how the politics of public opinion will be affected by the 
crises. The pandemic has made newly visible these demands for resilience, and 
the acceptance by states of responsibility—as well as their success in 
implementing responses—has revealed the capacity of state actors and 
agencies to tackle housing and property crises when sufficient pressure is 
brought to bear, and there is sufficient public support. At the same time, as the 
use and occupation of cities has been transformed—initially through 
lockdowns, and now as city workers, city dwellers, city authorities and planners 
re-evaluate the post-pandemic landscape (both figuratively and literally)—new 
models are emerging for the re-structuring of the city.196 Urban scholars have 
forecast four potential areas for change: loss of social opportunity during 
lockdowns and lingering trepidation around large scale-gatherings; a more or 
less successful experiment with remote working and shopping experiences; 
changes to public security around public spaces—for example, enhanced 
sanitary standards; and adaptations to the physical form of the built 
environment during the pandemic that have lasting effects.197  
 
Some evidence has suggested a modest urban exodus since the pandemic 
began in March 2020.198 One unexpected impact of this movement of people 
in the U.S. was the artificial inflation of real estate prices elsewhere, as city-
dwellers relocated from pricey urban real estate markets to newly-more 
desirable locations. One analyst observed that “[f]or employees in many 
industries, working remotely during the pandemic effectively has untethered 
them from their physical offices. Historically, but even more so during the 
pandemic, those with higher-income jobs are the most likely to work from 
home.199 As higher-paid workers have chosen to move from expensive urban 
housing to lower-cost locations,200 a new type of housing gap has emerged, 
prompted by the pressure on housing supply in previously lower-cost areas as 
well-to-do buyers have outpriced markets. The high-end homes left behind by 
city-dwellers opting to relocate may be converted to upscale short-term rentals 
rather than permanent housing. While the entrepreneurial city thrives on 
attracting talent, it does not necessarily need that talent to settle there for the 
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long-term.  
 
Newly-emerging patterns in housing preferences and use of housing stock 
could not have been predicted by cities or analysts before the pandemic. 
Indeed, in Farsighted: How we make the Decisions that Matter the Most, Stven 
Johnson highlighted the ways that limited foresight amongst decision-makers 
restricts their ability to respond effectively to longer-term problems. Drawing 
on the much-lampooned statement of Donald Rumsfeld during the Iraq 
War—that they faced “unknown unknowns”—Johnson highlighted the critical 
importance of developing and adopting methods of mapping problems that 
identify the blank spaces.201 As Johnson explained, mapping problems involves 
identifying not only the things we are certain of (the known knowns), but also 
the things we don’t know (the known unknowns) and the blind spots we don’t 
yet know we know about (the unknown unknowns). Reflecting on how this 
can be achieved, Johnson cited Tetlock’s landmark study on long-term 
forecasting, which identified the most important factor for successful 
forecasters: that they were characterized not by what they knew but by how they 
thought. He observed that: 
“One group tended to organize their thinking around Big Ideas, 
although they didn’t agree on which Big Ideas were true or false. Some 
were environmental doomsters (“We’re running out of everything”); 
others were cornucopian boomsters (“We can find cost-effective 
substitutes for everything”). Some were socialists (who favored state 
control of the commanding heights of the economy); others were free 
market fundamentalists (who wanted to minimize regulation). As 
ideologically diverse as they were, they were united by the fact that 
their thinking was so ideological. They sought to squeeze complex 
problems into the preferred cause-effect templates and treated what 
did not fit as irrelevant distractions…As a result they were unusually 
confident and likelier to declare things ‘impossible’ or ‘certain’…The 
other group consisted of more pragmatic experts who drew on many 
analytical tools, with the choice of tool hinging on the particular 
problem they faced. These experts gathered information from as many 
sources as they could….They talked about possibilities and 
probabilities, not certainties. And while no one likes to say ‘I was 
wrong’, these experts more readily admitted it and changed their 
minds.”202 
Tetlock’s description resonates with the approach we have developed in 
Resilient Property: that the most effective methodological approaches to tackle 
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complex problems: not through linear problem solving methods or the 
application of grand theories; but by mapping the problem space, while 
maintaining a sense of epistemic humility.  
 
As states, legal, property and market systems and the individuals and 
groups who participate in or are governed by these prepare to tackle the 
complex problems of the post-pandemic periods, the exact contours of which 
are not yet clear, flexibility to adapt to new information as it is revealed will 
remain vital. Flexibility is a fundamental determinant of resilience. The urgency 
with which actions were taken in the coronavirus pandemic provide a sightline 
into the capacity—and willingness, under sufficient pressure to do so—for 
(even some erstwhile ‘neoliberal’) states to up-scale putatively social-welfarist 
norms without depleting their own resilience. Indeed, in the context of the 
pandemic, these responses enhanced the resilience of states, as they faced their 
own crises of hegemony. They needed to be seen to take decisive and effective 
actions to control the virus and restore political and economic equilibrium, as 
well as tackling the public health crisis.  
 
While longer term forecasts are highly speculative—and we remain 
committed to epistemic humility—property theorists will inevitably reflect on 
what, if any, lasting legacy the pandemic crises might hold for property politics, 
property law and legal thought. In liberal property systems, we are accustomed 
to thinking about evictions (whether landlord/tenant or 
mortgagor/mortgagee) as ‘private’ disputes, between two transactional parties. 
Since the withdrawal of safety nets and the depletion of statutory protections 
for tenants from the 1980s, the state’s role in these property law actions has 
been seen as largely limited to the recognition and enforcement of rights-based 
claims. Yet, the scale of the global pandemic has brought the state’s own stake 
in property transactions, particularly in relation to homelessness and housing 
precarity, into clearer view. However the scales of political and public opinion 
settle upon these questions in each jurisdiction, in the decades to come, we 
have seen behind the curtain of putatively ‘private’ property law. The state’s 




The first major global pandemic in the western world was the Black Death, 
from 1346 to 1353. Robert Palmer traced the impact of the Black Death on 
English (private) law, describing the transformation that followed: from an 
old-paradigm based on the King’s authority, to a new acceptance of the 
inherent authority of ‘the state’.203 Palmer argued that one consequence of this 
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transition—which embedded the legitimacy of ‘law’ as a function of the 
inherent authority of the state—was the ‘scaling up’ of previously ‘local’ 
concerns to the national legal jurisdiction. Private disputes between subjects—
for example, contract disputes, tortious wrongdoing and remedies, labor and 
employment issues, and, crucially, property rights—were brought under the 
newly developed jurisdiction of ‘private law’. Palmer argued that this paradigm 
shift was a mechanism for re-establishing the social status-quo that had existed 
prior to the pandemic. In the aftermath of the pandemic, English aristocratic 
leaders set out to create a new national legal system, organizing the power of 
the state through law. They needed to re-establish social equilibrium—
adapting to the changed context to ensure that pre-pandemic power dynamics 
between the lower levels of society and the upper levels would be sustained. 
Although the inherent power of the state’s private law jurisdiction would later 
be concealed behind putatively neutral legal structures, the paradigm shift was 
necessary to restore equilibrium after the pandemic: the state acted to preserve 
the social order that gave it power.   
 
Palmer’s account of the evolution of private law in line state self-interest: 
to shore up its resilience following a period of crisis; resonates with our theory 
of Resilient Property. Periods of crises draw back the curtain on the state’s 
often-unseen role in private property law, casting fresh light on how 
organizing structures are deployed to advance individual and collective 
agendas, and on how these align with state self-interest. In moments of crises, 
the so-called ‘public/private divide’ becomes permeable and the state’s stake in 
the ‘private realm’ becomes visible–as states ‘direct’ what were erstwhile 
‘private’ matters. In moments of crises, the pressures and risks that states face 
for failing to act in the face of urgent property problems often trump the 
pressures and risks they face if they are seen to have over-reached the scope of 
their legitimate authority. The fact that states can actively direct property 
systems during these times, and that these actions function to shore up rather 
than deplete the state’s resilience, provides an important corrective to claims 
that state actors and agencies, private property systems, legal techniques and 
toolkits lack the capacity to respond to property’s wicked problems. Rather, it 
reveals the question of active state responses to wicked property problems as 
one of political possibility. 
 
